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This  paper  is an  attempt  to  shed  some  light  on issues  relating  to  social  protection  in
transition countries emerging from ethnic conflict. It analyzes how constraints posed both
by conflict itself and its ethnic  nature affect social  protection policies and suggests ways
out.  Both conflict  and continuing  ethnic tensions thereafter  affect  labor markets, as well
as  render  social  safety  net  policies  difficult  to implement.  Instead,  policymakers  often
have  to  resort  to  second-best  solutions.  In particular,  in  the  light of precarious  public
finances, a limited ability of the government to provide  services and assistance  and ethnic
tensions  massively constraining  social  safety nets, people will  continue to rely on many
wartime coping mechanisms.  Social protection  design has  to be mindful  of this and may
even build on these mechanisms.  Furthermore,  employment--fornal  and informal--needs
to  take  over  a  key  poverty  alleviation  role  in  a  post-ethnic-war  environment.  The
resulting  main  social  protection  policy  implication,  therefore,  is  to  create  the  right
conditions for the labor market to absorb those able to work.Table of Contents
A Post-Ethnic-Conflict  Environment Is Different ......................................................  viii
What Are the Challenges? ..........................................................  viii
What does  this Mean for Individual Instruments?  .......................................................  ix
Introduction  ........................................................... 1
Why is a Post-Ethnic-Conflict Environment  Different? ................................  ............... 3
Worsened Social  Problems ............................................................ 3
...  Decreased State  Capacity  .4
...  and Continuing Ethnic Tensions  .5
The Challenges  and Implications for Social  Protection: Constraints Related to
Violent Conflict ........................................................... 5
Displacement ............................................................ 5
The Challenges ........................................................... 6
Policy Options ........................................................... 7
Demobilization,  Veterans, and Disability ........................................................... 9
The Challenge ............................................................  0
Policy Options ........................................................... 11
Women ..........................................................  12
The Challenge ..........................................................  13
Policy Options ...........................................................  13
Children and Young People ...........................................................  13
The Challenge ..........................................................  14
Policy Options ...........................................................  14
Humanitarian Aid and Its Phasing  Out ...........................................................  15
The Challenge ..........................................................  15
Policy Options ...........................................................  15
Statistical Data Collection ...........................................................  17
Corruption,  State Capture, and the Unofficial  Economy .............................................  18
The Challenge ...........................................................  18
Policy Options ..........................................................  19
The Challenges  and Implications for Social  Protection: Constraints Related to
Ethnic Tensions ..........................................................  20
Post-War Interethnic Tensions ..........................................................  20
The Challenge .......................................................... 20
Policy Options ..........................................................  23Social  Protection in Post-War Bosnia and Herzegovina  and Georgia .......................  26
Bosnia and Herzegovina .............................................................  26
Georgia .............................................................  28
Conclusion  ............................................................  30
References .............................................................  33
Boxes
1: Linking Humanitarian Aid and Development:  Food-for-Work Projects of the World
Food Program in the Southern Caucasus .............................................................  17
2:  Three Separate Pension Systems in Bosnia and Herzegovina ......................................  21
3: The Georgian Social Investment Fund in Breakaway South Ossetia ............  ...............  24
Tables
1. Comparative  Output Collapse in the CIS .............................................................  3
2. Refugees and Displaced Persons in 2000 ............................................  ................. 6
3. The Share of the Unofficial  Economy in Selected CIS Countries,  1995 ...........  ...........  19
4. Bosnia and Herzegovina:  Annual  GDP Growth in Percent ..........................................  27
5. Georgia: Annual  GDP Growth in Percent .............................................................  29Executive Summary
Since  the  breakdown  of  communism  in  Eastern  Europe  and  Central  Asia,  several
countries in the region have witnessed violent ethnic conflict. Ethnic  conflict worsens the
social  crisis  associated  with  the  post-communist  transition  and  provides  serious
challenges  and constraints for social protection.
A Post-Ethnic-Conflict  Environment Is Different
Ethnic  conflict  in transition  countries  blocks  or interrupts  the process  of economic  and
political  reforrn.  As  a consequence,  the  social  protection  system  in a transition  country
emerging from ethnic conflict is both in need of reform and needs to deal with the social
effects of war at the same time.
War  worsens  social problems  in that  it fuels  the breakdown  of economic  activity
and delays recovery.  Moreover,  it produces new groups of vulnerable people  who are in
need of support: internally displaced persons and refugees,  demobilized soldiers, disabled
people, single- and female-headed households, and orphans.
War  decreases  the  capacity of the state  to  respond  to these  challenges,  which  is
already under strain  in the transition. Administrative  capacity  tends to be even lower and
corruption  worse than  in  other  transition  countries.  Public  finances  are  in a  precarious
state  because  of low  or  inexistent  tax  collection  and high  military  spending.  Political
action is constrained by instability.
Continuing  ethnic  tensions  complicate  social  safety  net  reform  and  rule  out
interethnic redistribution because different ethnic groups may refuse to share funds with a
former enemy.  Ethnic  minorities may be  left out and discriminated  against  in the  labor
market.
What Are the Challenges?
The  constraints  and  challenges  social  protection  faces  in  such  an  environment  can  be
distinguished into those relating to the violent conflict itself and those that stem from its
ethnic nature.  While the former do not necessarily affect policy design but just exacerbate
the needs, ethnic tension constraints can limit the social safety net options severely.
*  Conflict-induced  challenges  to  social  protection  pertain  to  the  problem  of
displacement,  demobilization  and disability,  the new role of women, the needs
of children  and young people, the phasing  out of humanitarian  emergency  aid,
the  destruction  of the  data  collection  infrastructure  as well  as the  absence  of
reliable data, corruption, and the size of the unofficial economy.*  Challenges  relating to continuing ethnic tensions  render  many of the  formal
safety  net interventions  difficult  to  implement  and have  a disruptive  effect  on
the labor market. In particular, social assistance, pensions, and even social funds
are constrained by the political acceptability of interethnic  redistribution as well
as targeting of and discrimination against minorities.
*  A  window  of opportunity for bold reform:  Those constraints  notwithstanding,
there  is  an  open  window  of opportunity  for  wholesale  change  of the  social
protection  framework  because  of  the  complete  breakdown  and  the  delayed
recovery of transition economies affected by ethnic conflict. Namely, politicians
face the choice of either re-establishing  the pre-war socialist policies that, on the
face  of it,  are  hardly  affordable,  or pushing ahead  with bold reforms aimed  at
promoting employment and an efficient  social safety net.
What does this Mean for Individual Instruments?
Labor market: The key post-war  social protection priorities  are to create an environment
that  is attractive  to  employment  creation  and  to equip  people  with  the  right  skills  and
information  to  facilitate  their  entry.  While  war  worsens  the  transition-related
unemployment  crisis and produces vulnerable  groups with particular problems  in finding
employment,  ethnic tensions may lead to labor market segmentation along ethnic lines.
*  Demobilized  soldiers,  displaced  people,  and  women  all  face  a  variety  of
problems  limiting  their  opportunities  in  the  labor  market.  They  may  have
outdated  or inadequate  skills,  face discrimination,  or lack a network that helps
them find employment.  In the  immediate aftermath public works programs can
help ease this, while long-term  improvements need to be built on labor market
deregulation,  training  programs,  and  advisory  and  job  information  services.
Members  of  ethnic  minorities  may  benefit  from  anti-discriminatory  labor
legislation and its enforcement.
*  A  nascent  peace  process  usually  sparks  an  economic  boom  fuelled  by
reconstruction  activities  and  the  breakdown  of  war-induced  barriers  to
economic  activity.  The  post-war  boom  should  be  used  to  create  employment
instead  of engraving  people's  perceptions  of the  continued  affordability  of a
socialist-style  welfare  state.  Donor-financed  and labor-intensive  reconstruction
and the  use of public  work programs can  help to  integrate  former  combatants
into civilian life quickly to help stabilize the post-war environment.
*  Labor  legislation  and  regulation  should be carefully  balanced.  While there is a
need  for  anti-discrimination  legislation  to  stem  labor  market  segmentation,
regulation should be hands off. For instance,  initially there will be vastly more
employment generation  in the informal than in the formal sector,  and there  is a
good  case  to  be  made  not  to  reign in  informal  economic  development.  State
intervention might push informal  businesses out of business rather than into the
formal sector, with adverse effects on employment.
*  Young people should benefit from special  skills training and know-how transfer
focusing  on new technologies and job profiles  to  improve their chances  in thelabor market  and to  make them leading  agents  in the  resumption  of economic
activity;  young  people  are  likely to  be  less risk-averse  than older  people  and
may be more prone to start their own businesses.
*  However, employment creation is also dependent on factors outside the realm of
social protection, namely on those factors  that promote  economic  development
and growth.
Social assistance: Post-communist  countries  often  emerge  from war with  the  old-
style  complex  welfare  state  system  intact  but  without  the  necessary  funds  and  huge
demand.  The main  and  more long-term aim in  a post-ethnic-conflict  situation should be
to create  an entirely new and transparent  social safety net system and not to reinstate old
socialist-type  redistributive policies, especially  in the light of continuing  ethnic tensions.
Regardless of war-induced high demand for the welfare state, these tensions may rule out
redistribution mechanisms  reaching across ethnic  lines.
*  Continuing  ethnic  tensions  may,  at  least  initially,  render  the  introduction  of
countrywide  social  assistance  systems  and  cross-subsidies  impossible  to
implement. To avoid putting a peace process at risk, pressures to introduce  such
systems should be avoided-and efforts  should be limited to harmonization  until
the political situation allows further movement.
*  The  old  system's  nontransparent  nature  can  be  and  has  been  used  as  an
argument in stirring up ethnic tensions that lead to the outbreak of conflict in the
first place. Likewise, the same argument can continue to be used by pro-conflict
politicians to paralyze  the peace  process.  Redistributive  elements of the  safety
net  should therefore  be transparent  and build  upon noncomplex  criteria and on
sound poverty and social data analysis.
*  Irrespective  of ethnic tension  constraints,  there is a need to adjust entitlements
and focus  on the  needs  of the  most vulnerable  to avoid  building  up  payment
arrears because  of insufficient funds that could undermine the credibility of the
entire  system.
*  The system needs to be kept simple because of narrow administrative  capacities
and funds.  For example,  cash benefits may  initially have to rely on categorical
targeting.
*  With  emergency  humanitarian  aid  being  phased  out  over  time,  public  social
assistance  schemes  will  have  to take  over to  help  the very vulnerable.  Public
intervention  should  continue  to  coordinate  and  complement  third  sector
activities.  Pro bono nongovernmental  organizations  (NGOs) should be provided
with  the  right  incentives  such  as  simple  registration  processes  and  tax
exemption.
*  Social  services  play  an  important  role  in  providing  support,  counseling,  and
rehabilitation  to  vulnerable  groups  such  as  the  disabled,  children,  (young)
former  soldiers,  or  women  who  are  victims  of  rape,  domestic  violence,  or
trafficking.  Social  workers  should  receive  special  training  to  enable  them  to
offer these services.Pensions:  Pension  systems  struggle  under  a  number  of  conflict-induced
constraints-structural  and financial.  On top of these, ethnic tensions may provide  another
set of formidable  institutional  constraints,  in that pension systems reaching  across ethnic
lines may be politically unacceptable.  Reform  efforts should be concentrated on making a
very simple and transparent system workable and sustainable.
*  War  puts  the sustainability  of a pay-as-you-go  pension  system  under massive
strain;  death  and  disability  decrease  the  numbers  of  contributors  with  the
shrinking  of  the  male  working-age  population  and  raise  the  numbers  of
beneficiaries.
*  To  keep the pension system as simple and  as transparent  as  possible, pensions
should be of a flat rate nature and calculated on a pay-as-you-go  basis. From a
political  economy point of view,  it is important  first to make  the system work
and  to  pay  pensions  on  time  before  raising  individual  pension  levels  and
introducing differentiation according to contributions, so as to raise the people's
trust in the institution.
*  If countries  emerge from ethnic conflict with more than one pension  system in
one jurisdiction  for ethnic  tension reasons,  reform  efforts  should be  limited to
improving  harmonization  between  the  two  pension  systems.  Merging  them
might put the stability of the peace process at risk.
Social funds:  Social  funds  have  the  advantageous  feature  that  they  are  very
adaptable  to  different  and  extreme  situations  and  can  be used  as  an  emergency  and  a
long-term development tool. However, ethnic tensions affect their operability, and careful
design is essential.
*  Many of the characteristics of social fund operations  fit the special requirements
of  a  post-ethnic-conflict  situation  well  (the  need  to  rehabilitate  destroyed
infrastructure,  the  need  to  generate  employment  and  stimulate  economic
development  on a  grassroots  level,  and  the need  to  raise  social  capital  and  to
empower  communities).  Social  funds can  indeed  be  designed  with  a focus  on
infrastructure,  employment  (at  least  in  the  very  short  term),  community
development,  improvement  of  social  service  delivery,  or  support  for
decentralization.
*  Social  funds have the potential to build bridges between different ethnic groups
and former  opponents.  However,  this  requires  careful  design,  depends  on the
peace  process,  and  requires  a  minimum  of  interethnic  tolerance  to  allow
different  ethnic  groups  to  communicate  at  least  over  such  noncontroversial
issues  as  infrastructure  rehabilitation.  Social  funds  should  not be  expected  to
perform  bridging  functions  in  a  climate  of heightened  ethnic  tensions  and
violence, and this should not be set out as one of the main ambitions of a social
fund project in a post-ethnic-conflict  setting.Examining wartime coping mechanisms reveals what is possible in the aftermath of
war and how people cope in the absence of a public social safety net.
*  Those  coping  mechanisms  include  (i)  reliance  on  small-scale  agricultural
production,  (ii)  merging  households,  (iii)  nonpayment  of public  service  bills,
(iv)  remittances  from  abroad,  (v)  sale  of  personal  belongings,  and  (vi)
unregistered  and informal work.
*  At the very least, public intervention  should not be  in the way of those coping
mechanisms  that  are  legal,  but  it  may  even  build  on  these  mechanisms.
Fostering  the productivity  of small-scale  agriculture  through  training  and  the
supply  of equipment  could  be  one  such  option.  Incidentally  this  may  also
counter  urbanization  by  providing  demobilized  soldiers  and displaced  people
with a source of income in rural areas.
Institutional framework:  Welfare  state  reform  is  not  limited  to  designing  new
policies  but  also  includes  reforming  institutions--especially  in  transition  countries
emerging from armed conflict.
*  Reform  is not only a matter of doing away with inefficient  structures  surviving
from pre-war communist times  (for instance by fostering  decentralization),  but
there is the additional  task  of overhauling  those institutions  built during  war to
deal  with  war-related  issues.  For  example,  often  countries  end  up  with more
than one ministry dealing with issues related to veterans and disability.
*  Furthermore,  fighting  corruption  and  making  links  between  the  state
administration and various private and political  agents transparent are important
parts of social protection reform.Emerging from Ethnic Conflict:
Challenges  for Social Protection Design
in Transition Countries
Christian  Bodewig, Consultant, Human Development Sector Unit, Eastern
Europe and Central  Asia Region, World Bank'
I. Introduction
Since the breakdown of communism in Eastern  Europe  and Central Asia, several countries  in
the  region  have  witnessed  violent  ethnic  conflict.2 Ethnic  conflict  leaves  these  countries
struggling with three different sets of p  roblems  simultaneously.  First, they have to deal with
the  post-communist  transition  itself.  Second,  conflict  results  in  further  problems  and
challenges  that deepen the transition crisis ancl delay recovery.  Third, strategies to overcome
these challenges are complicated by the ethnic nature of the conflict.
Realizing  that  civil  wars  and  ethnic  conflict  affect  many  developing  countries,
intemational  development  institutions  such  as  the  World  Bank  and  the  United  Nations
Development Programme  have over the last few years tried to systematically approach post-
conflict  issues,  explore their  implications  for development,  and examine  what role they  can
play in the process of post-conflict reconstruction  (see UNDP 2000 and World Bank 1998).
This  paper  is  an  attempt  to  take  this  analytical  work  further  by  examining  the
implications  of conflict  and  in  particular  ethnic  conflict  for social  protection  in  transition
countries.4 It is  an attempt  to  shed some  light  on the constraints  and  options policymakers
face when  designing  social  safety  nets in post-ethnic-conflict  situations.  The  paper  divides
the  constraints  into those related to  conflict itself and those related  to its ethnic nature.  The
approach is a conceptual  and not an empiric one. While drawing from experience in different
conflict-affected  countries  in  Eastern  Europe  and Central  Asia,  this is not a study of those
X I  am  grateful  for  comments  and  input  from  Thomas  Hoopengarder  and  Philip  O'Keefe,  as  well  as  from
Nicholas Barr, Anush Bezhanyan,  Kendra Gregson, Margaret Grosh,  Steven Holtzman, Andrei Markov, Maniza
Naqvi,  Aleksandra  Posarac,  Dena  Ringold,  Michal  Rutkowski,  Hjalte  Sederlof,  Alan  Thompson,  and
participants  at  two review  seminars.  I thank  the  Robert  Bosch  Foundation  and  the  German  National  Merit
Foundation for funding.  I can be reached at cbodewig(a)web.de.
2  The  countries  that  fall  into  this  category  are  Armenia,  Azerbaijan  (Nagomo-Karabakh),  Bosnia  and
Herzegovina,  Croatia,  Georgia  (Abkhazia  and  South  Ossetia),  the  former  Yugoslav Republic  of Macedonia,
Moldova  (Transnistria),  the Russia Federation (Chechnya),  Tajikistan, and the Federal  Republic  of Yugoslavia
(Kosovo).
3 Transition  in this paper invariably means the transition from communist central planning to a market economy
and not the transition from war to peace, unless otherwise stated.
4 Social protection  is defined  here to include  labor markets and social safety nets (social  assistance and pensions
and  social  funds;  unemployment  insurance  is  not  covered  because  it  is  an  instrument  rarely  available  in  an
immediate post-war crisis).individual  countries  and  an assessment  of policies  implemented  there.  Although  the paper
attempts  to  develop  policy  options  for the  politically  delicate  and  economically  desperate
settings  after a  war,  some of the options  for the  post-settlement  case  may  be relevant  for
latent ethnic disputes and conflicts that have not escalated  into war.
Although  no  post-conflict  situation  is  alike  and  different  peace  processes  follow
different paths, it is useful to distinguish two broadly  separate periods, the  immediate  period
of stabilization  and the more  long-term  period of reconstruction.  In the stabilization  period
the main goal  is to  achieve  stability,  while  developmental  and equity  issues are  secondary.
Social  safety  net  policies  can  sometimes  be  used  to  support the  stabilization  process.  For
instance,  veterans'  benefits  and  demobilization  programs  should  be  seen  as  a  means  of
"buying"  support  from  former  combatants  for  the  peace  agreement  and  making  them lay
down their arms. A key challenge for social safety nets early on is to make sure that receding
provision  of humanitarian  aid does  not create  gaps of coverage.  Any intervention has to be
simple and easy to administer and therefore be based on indicator targeting and using flat rate
benefits  and  pensions.  The  main  emphasis  should  lie  on easing  the  pronounced  post-war
unemployment  crisis and making use of a potential  post-war boom to generate employment.
Overall,  however,  there is  little  scope for redistributive  interventions,  both because there  is
not much to redistribute and because poverty is widespread.
Over time, depending on the peace progress and in particular the receding of interethnic
tensions,  social  safety  net  design  will  become  less  constrained.  In  the  more  long-term
reconstruction  phase  an  evolving  functioning  institutional  framework,  a  clear  division  of
responsibilities between higher and lower tiers of government,  and sound public finances will
make  formal  social  safety nets more  sustainable  and affordable.  Meanwhile,  ethnic tensions
complicate social safety net design in both periods and affect nearly all types of formal safety
net intervention.
A note of caution. The term "post-ethnic-conflict  situation" has severe limitations in that
the transition from war to peace  almost never follows  a smooth and linear path.  The type of
ethnic conflict we are dealing with here is that of violent conflict, that is, ethnic warfare that
has been  ended  by  a ceasefire.  However,  a  ceasefire  does  not necessarily  represent  a  final
settlement and peace agreement.  Conflicts can go on for years without a resumption of large-
scale, systematic, and countrywide  violence, but also without a final settlement or agreement
(sometimes  called  a frozen  conflict).  Almost  any  peace  process  encounters  setbacks  (there
remains  a continuous  threat of renewed  hostilities),  and  social  safety  net  design  has to be
mindful of those constraints  and dynamics so as to avoid fuelling the resumption of violence
by promoting wrong policy choices.
The  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  II  analyzes  the  ways  that  post-conflict
situations are different from the mere post-communist  transition. Sections  III and IV examine
what constraints related to conflict and its ethnic nature mean for individual social protection
mechanisms.  For every constraint the paper first lists the challenges  and then possible policy
options  of how to  deal with  them.  Section  V describes  the  social  protection  experience  in
post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina  and Georgia.  Section VI concludes.
2II. Why is a Post-Ethnic-Conflict  Environment Different?
Economies in Eastern Europe and Central Asia coming out of ethnic conflict tend to be in an
even  more  difficult  situation  than  other  transition  economies.  While  conflict  deepens  the
transition-induced  crisis,  the  ethnic  nature  of  conflict  constrains  the  design  of  social
protection  further.  This  section  sets  out  to  analyze  why  and  how  much  a  post-conflict
environment is different from mere post-communist  transition.
Worsened Social Problems...
Breakdown  of  economic  activity  and  delayed  recovery:  Conflict-affected  Transition
economies  have  seen  their  economies  collapse  more  dramatically  than  elsewhere  in  the
region.  As table  1 shows, the war-torn countries in the Commonwealth  of Independent  States
(CIS)  have  seen  output  slumps  well  above  the  CIS  average.5 Infrastructure  has  been
destroyed,  physical  and  human  capital  decimated,  and  transport-routes  interrupted  by
frontlines.  Furthermore,  conflict  has  delayed  economic  reform,  the  restructuring  of
enterprises, and reallocation of labor from socialist inefficient production  to more productive
activity. Therefore,  recovery  and a return to growth have been  delayed as  well. Not only do
war-affected  transition countries start from a deeper slump, but they also start their recovery
later than any other reform country  in Eastern Europe  and Central Asia.
Table 1. Comparative Output Collapse in the CIS















Unemployment in  some conflict-affected  countries is  extremely high.  This has poverty
implications,  because  labor market  status  tends  to  be  strongly  associated  with  poverty  in
transition  countries.  In the absence  of employment  opportunities  in the formal  sector, many
people  seek  work in the  informal  sector or migrate.  However,  internally  displaced  persons,
5  Aslund (2001)  does not examine  how much this output  collapse  is attributable to war itself,  but argues  that
excessively low investment during the conflict years and thereafter contributed.
3refugees,  and ethnic  minorities might not stand a chance  of finding employment even in the
informal  sector,  implying that  unemployment  is more  long-term  and  widespread  for these
groups,  and  they  have  to  rely  on  other  coping  mechanisms.  Furthermore,  the  size  of the
informal  sector has severe implications  for tax collection and the sustainability of the pension
system, because contributions and taxes are either not paid at all or not regularly.
New  vulnerable groups: Conflict produces new and distinct and particularly vulnerable
groups:  (i)  internally  displaced people  and refugees  who are in need of assistance  in form of
food,  shelter,  and  health  care;  (ii)  single-  and  female-headed  households,  which  are  more
widespread  in post-conflict  countries because of the loss of the male head of the household
during  the  war,  are  especially  vulnerable,  and  women  find  it  more  difficult  to  find
employment  and  very  often  receive  lower  salaries;  (iii)  war  veterans  and  disabled  people
provide  another  challenge  for  the  social  safety  net,  in  that  they  may  find  it  difficult  to
reintegrate  into civilian life and may be disadvantaged  in the labor market.  However,  support
for them is often politically driven and therefore rather generous,  not least because politicians
feel they need to purchase the former combatants'  support for a ceasefire or peace agreement.
... Decreased State Capacity...
While  the  demand  for  public  social  service  delivery  and  social  protection  is  dramatically
increased  by  war,  the  capacity  of the  state  to  respond  is  dramatically  narrowed.  This  is
evident in a number of areas.
Administrative  capacity:  The  administrative  capacity  in  civil-war-affected  countries
tends  to be even  lower than in other transition  economies.  In war people  and knowledge  as
well as funds  are withdrawn  from the public  administration,  and years  of conflict and  crisis
hold  back  administrative  reform  that  is taking  place  elsewhere  in  transition  countries  (for
example,  computerization of unemployment records andtraining of staff).
Public finances: While public  finances  are in a precarious  state in nearly  all transition
countries, and in particular in the CIS, war worsens the  situation considerably.  Investment  in
the war effort diverts funds away from other parts of government activity.  At the same time,
the economic  collapse,  steeper and more protracted than elsewhere, reduces the revenue  base.
Tax collection  is bad,  as the authorities  often lack the means and the will to crack down on
tax  avoidance,  and  informal  economic  activity has  no public  finance  effects  by definition.
Narrow  public finances  make the generous  welfare  state  surviving the war  from communist
times unaffordable.
Corruption  and politicization:  At  the  same  time,  war  worsens  corruption  usually
associated  with transition.  Anarchical  conditions  during  war breed politicization of the state
administration  and  a  complex  system  of  nontransparent  links  between  the  state
administration  and  various  private  and  sometimes  illegal  agents.  These  represent  vested
interests potentially opposed to changing the economic and social structures in the country.
Political and instability constraints: In a post-war setting social problems can get more
easily out  of hand, because  social  unrest  is more likely.  For instance,  people not  receiving
their  pensions  are  more  prone  to  demonstrate  in  an  emotionally  heated  post-conflict
environment  and  given  the  proliferation  of firearms,  any  demonstration  can  turn  into  a
catastrophe.  Very  often,  especially  when  the  state  is  in  arrears  to  many  beneficiaries,  it
4channels  the  priority funds to  the group  that is expected  to  cause  most trouble.  Politicians
might  feel  the  need to  prioritize  certain  groups  of vulnerable  people  for  political  reasons,
whether  this  is  efficient  or  not.  For  instance  they  might  purchase  support  for  the  peace
process from former combatants by providing generous veterans'  assistance to them.
... and Continuing Ethnic Tensions
While  most of the constraints  analyzed  so far resemble  those any transition  country faces--
just worse--the  following ethnic-conflict-driven  constraints  are truly distinctive  and have  an
impact  on the design  of social  safety  nets.  In  some countries  two or more  different  ethnic
groups  continue to share one jurisdiction  after the conflict  and ethnic tensions may continue.
This  situation  arises  where  there  is  some  refugee  and  internally  displaced  persons  (IDPs)
return,  where  ethnic  minorities  remain  in  one  jurisdiction  or  where,  following  a  peace
agreement,  two  former  warring  ethnic  groups  are  lumped  together.  Examples  for the  first
case are the Gali district in Abkhazia  in Georgia,  which  has seen a number of waves of IDP
returnees from the other side of the front line. The  latter case is exemplified  by the Bosnian-
Croat federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The impossibility  of interethnic redistribution: Whenever  two ethnic  groups share  one
jurisdiction  after  a  conflict,  continuing  ethnic  tensions,  based  on  the  experiences  and
grievances  of the war,  can provide  another set of constraints  to social safety net design.  For
example,  they  make  any  form  of interethnic  redistribution  and  cross-subsidies  difficult  to
implement.  Likewise,  they  can  lead  to  labor  market  segmentation  through  ethnic
discrimination.  Furthermore,  they have powerful  political  implications,  as  the federation  in
Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  shows,  where  attempts  at  building  joint  institutions--and
countrywide  social  safety  nets  are  such  institutions--have  the  potential  to  put  the  peace
process  on hold and require careful maneuvering.
III. The Challenges  and Implications for Social Protection: Constraints
Related to Violent Conflict
This section attempts to spell out the kind of constraints and challenges violent conflict poses
for different social protection mechanisms  and what the policy implications are. They include
issues as diverse  as displacement,  demobilization  and war veterans,  disability,  the changing
role of women,  the role of humanitarian  aid,  the lack  of statistical  data,  and the corruption
and  politicization  of the  economic  sphere.  The  constraints  relating  to the  ethnic  nature  of
conflict are examined in the following section.
Displacement
The  ethnic  wars  in  Eastern  Europe  and  Central  Asia  have  almost  always  led  to  massive
displacement  problems.  While hundreds  of thousand of people were pushed across  external
borders  and became  refugees,  a  growing  number  of people  become  displaced  within  the
recognized  national  boundaries  of their  own  country  (IDPs).  Table  2  gives  the  United
Nation's High Commissioner for Refugee's  (JNHCR's)  displacement  data for the year 2000
and shows the percentage of those displaced in the total population.
5Table 2. Refugees  and Displaced Persons in 2000
Percentage  of
total
Total  population of
population  concern to
Asylum-  Returned  Internally  Returned  of concern  Total  total
Country  Refugees  seekers  refugees  displaced  IDPs  Various  to UNHCR  population  population
Arnenia  280,591  - - - - 280,591  3.827,000  7.3
Azerbaijan  2876  3,376  27  572,451  - 51,649  627,790  8,052.000  7.8
Herzegovina  38,152  SO  18,715  518,252  59,347  - 634,546  3,923,000  16.2
Croatia  22,437  19  20,716  34,134  15,494  - 92,800  4,460,000  2.1
Georgia  7,620  - 81  272.101  284  100  280,186  5,460,000  5.1
Federation  26,265  691  37  490.650  70,000  753,882  1,341,525  145,542,096  0.9
Yugoslavia,
Federal  484,391  12  124,514  267.500  - 85,000  961,417  10,616,000  9.6
Republic of
Source: UNHCR and World Bank data.
The Challenges
Displacement  is long term:  Displacement  in Eastern Europe  and  Central Asia is of a long-
term nature.7  It is notable  that, with the exception of Russia and  Chechnya,  all  countries  in
table 2 have seen the beginning of their displacement problem a number of years ago and are
still struggling  with it today.  Displacement  in Armenia and Azerbaijan  has been going on for
14 years;  that in Croatia,  Georgia,  and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia  for I  1 years; and
in Bosnia and Herzegovina for  10 years.
Not  only  during  armed  conflict,  but  also  in  case they  cannot  return  for  many  years,
refugees  and  IDPs  usually  form  the  most  vulnerable  part  of society.  They  are  typically
without decent  accommodation  and access to proper education and health care. Furthermore,
they  are completely  uprooted  and without any  access to those  essential  coping  mechanisms
open  to  closely-knit  communities  (for  example  to  find  employment  or  share  housing  and
food).  A  survey  conducted  by  the  International  Federation  of the  Red  Cross  and  the  Red
Crescent  Societies  (IFRC)  in Georgia  documents  the  difficult  socioeconomic  situation  of
IDPs: IDPs and especially those living in collective centers remain poorer than the rest of the
population,  regardless  of governmental  IDP assistance  (IFRC 2000).  A higher likelihood  of
poverty  among IDPs  compared  to the  rest of the  population  has also  been  documented  for
Azerbaijan  (World  Bank  1997).  At  the  same  time,  the responses  to  displacement  that  are
typically  available  are inadequate to  deal with prolonged  displacement problems.  Supplying
humanitarian aid to those IDPs and refugees living in collective  centers and perhaps paying a
6 This represents the number of refugees who arrived  in Azerbaijan  in the year 2000. The 1999 figure  was about
220,000,  which  represented  ethnic  Azeri  refugees  from  Armenia  who  both  the  Azeri  government  and  the
UNHCR do not consider to return.  The UNHCR has, therefore, dropped these refugees from its record.
The  distinction  between  internally  displaced  people  and  refugees  in the  conflict  countries  in the  region
becomes  less important,  because  in those  countries  with  a large number of refugees  (Armenia  and the Federal
Republic  of Yugoslavia),  the refugees belong almost exclusively  to the ethnic  group of their host countries  and
intend to  stay there  (and expect  to be  naturalized).  While  elsewhere  in  the  world  refugees provide  a distinct
problem because they are expected to return one day, this is not the case here and the challenges  in dealing with
refugees  and IDPs, namely settlement and self-reliance, are similar.
6flat-rate  benefit  financed  out  of  the  state  budget  to  every  one  is  adequate  for  brief
displacement  crises  such as  that of Kosovar refugees  in Albania and the  Former  Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia in 1999. In the case of long-term displacement it locks individuals up
in a  vicious  circle  of dependency  that  is  increasingly  difficult  to  break  with  every month
displacement continues.
Social assistance: Some countries  might want  to choose  to grant  a special  benefit  for
IDPs out of the  general budget for political reasons8. In this case  IDPs place a further claim
on  a  social  safety  net  system  that  already  struggles  to  remedy  poverty  induced  by  the
transition.  If generous,  such  assistance  can eat up a significant part of the  social  assistance
budget  that  could otherwise  be allocated  to  fighting  transition-induced  poverty  among  the
rest  of the  population.  Even  where  countrywide  numbers  of  displaced  people  appear
manageable,  this may not be the  case regionally.  If IDPs are  highly concentrated  in overly
poor  areas,  the  social  safety  net  there  can  hit  crisis  point.  For  instance,  war-induced
displacement often fuels urbanization:  IDPs and refugees move to the urban  centers, because
they think they have the  greatest options for income  generation  there. While  a one-size-fits-
all benefit for IDPs is vulnerable  to criticism  from an equity point of view,  it is also clearly
inefficient  in  the  case  of prolonged  displacement,  because  some  IDPs  may  find  outside
opportunities of generating  income over time.9
Labor market: Internally displaced persons tend to be severely  disadvantaged  in finding
employment, because they lack the all-important  network of contacts necessary  to find a job
in the tight post-war labor market.' 0 Not surprisingly, unemployment  rates usually are higher
among IDPs than among the rest of the population.  The IFRC  survey in Georgia shows that
today the  unemployment  rate among IDPs  in private  accommodation  is about twice  as high
as that of the general population, while that among IDPs living in collective  centers  is about
three  times  as  high.  The  situation  is  especially  tense  in  urban  centers,  because  displaced
people often move to urban areas. Displacement  also often drives labor market segmentation:
displaced people  often engage  in self-employment  such as  small-scale  street trading  that is
not attractive to  other groups  of people.  This has  implications  also for wages:  IDPs tend to
earn less than non-IDP workers.
Policy Options
When  displacement  is  short-term,  it can  and  should  be  treated  as  a temporary  issue  and
assistance  should  be mainly of an emergency  type.  People are  supplied  with humanitarian
aid, medical  services,  and education--mostly  by (international)  humanitarian  organizations--
which can be supplemented  by a public benefit for IDPs. The issue becomes  more complex
when displacement  continues over a longer period and where the possibility of return in the
near future  is in doubt.  Both  Georgia and Azerbaijan  struggle with a displacement  problem
that has been ongoing ever since the armed clashes  in Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh,  and
there is little hope for imminent return.  Likewise,  in Bosnia and Herzegovina more than half
a  million  people  remain  internally  displaced--six  years  after  the  Dayton  Peace  Accords,
s For example Georgia has a special monthly allowance for IDPs,  while IDPs in Bosnia and Herzegovina do not
receive any special benefit from their governments.
9 In  a  situation  of widespread  poverty,  distinct targeting  of IDPs  may trigger  serious  political  problems  by
driving a wedge  between the IDP community and the rest of the population.
10  In many countries refugees are not officially entitled to work.
7which  were meant  to  guarantee  the return  of refugees.'"  For these  people who  survive  on
irregular  humanitarian  aid  and  other  coping  mechanisms,  another  assistance  strategy  is
needed--one that focuses more on generating  self-reliance  and helps the displaced to integrate
more in their host communities.'2
•  Creating conditions conducive  to  return: Although  the  return  of  refugees  and
internally  displaced persons is almost exclusively  dependent on the political  will of
the parties to the conflict,  several of the underlying structural issues lie in the realm
of social  protection.  Anti-discrimination  legislation  may help  counter  widespread
discrimination  in the labor market  against  ethnic minority returnees,  although  it is
dependent on the power of the rule of law, the functioning and the reliability of the
judicial  process,  and  people's  awareness  of  their  rights.  Likewise,  pensioner
returnees need  entitlement security  in the case of multiple  pension systems.  Social
fund-financed  reconstruction  activities  can  be  designed  such that they pay special
attention to the rehabilitation of returnee houses.
*  Focusing on employment generation for IDPs: The  longer  displacement  persists,
the  more  important  it  is  to  enable  IDPs  to  become  more  self-reliant  and  less
dependent  on  a  one-size-fits-all  and  typically  low  IDP  benefit  plus  occasional
humanitarian  food aid.  Because IDPs often are significantly disadvantaged  when it
comes  to  finding  employment  and  because  unemployment  tends to  be  positively
related with  poverty, there  may be  a point in tackling IDP poverty with measures
aimed  at generating  employment  and  increasing  income  from other  sources--both
for wage  and  self-employment.  Because  wage  employment  is  more  prevalent  in
urban areas,  attempts should be made to increase the employability of IDPs through
training  programs  or  facilitate  their  job  search.  In  rural  areas,  where  self-
employment  in  agriculture  is  most  common,  IDPs  can  raise  household  income
through  improving  access  to  land  and  to  higher  quality  land  in  particular.
Furthermore,  IDPs  in  rural  areas  also  might  benefit  from  agricultural  training  to
improve  the productivity  of land  use.  Donor-financed  reconstruction  activities  are
tools to provide employment opportunities early on, at least in the short-term.
In case there is political pressure to address displacement-induced  poverty with a special
benefit  aimed  at IDPs,  the following  options could  be  considered  to ensure  a minimum  of
efficiency  and equity.'3
*  Integrating vulnerability criteria  for cash benefits for IDPs and the  rest of the
population: As  long  as  cash  benefits  are  awarded  on  the  basis  of  categorical
targeting,  vulnerability  criteria  for  IDP  and  nonIDP  communities  could  be
integrated  in  the longer  term  so as to allow those  vulnerable  households  (IDP and
nonIDP) without any member able to work to receive  a poverty benefit. Vulnerable
groups  in  the  nonIDP  community  tend  to  be  single  pensioners,  children  without
At the end of the war, the figure stood at 1.  I million IDPs.
12  This may be  impossible,  though, if the integration  is prevented  for political reasons:  in both  frozen  conflicts
in Azerbaijan  and  Georgia,  the  political  leaderships  are  opposed  to  the  concept  of (even  a  temporary)
integration of IDPs, as this is seen to compromise the right to return.
'3 This is based on the argument that for administrative  and financial  reasons,  post-conflict  transition countries
should  choose  indicator  targeting  for  cash  benefits  at  least  in the  short  term.  Means  testing  could  then  be
introduced  over time, once  administrative and financial pressures  ease.
8both parents, families with all members disabled, and the rural population. 1
4 The set
of criteria could  be  widened to  include  families  residing  in designated  collective
centers,  large  families,  and  women-headed  households--in  short  those  groups  of
IDPs  that  are extremely  vulnerable.  However,  in the short-term  a narrow  revenue
base and limited funds available  for poverty alleviation may render an integration of
IDP benefit and other types of social  assistance unaffordable.
Introducing self-targeting mechanisms:  In  the  light  of extremely  narrow  public
finances,  there  is  a  case  for  introducing  mechanisms  to  target  exclusively  those
households  that  are  truly  vulnerable  instead  of creating  a  one-size-fits-all  IDP
benefit.  This  could  be  done  through  a  scheme  under  which  IDPs  do  not
automatically  qualify  for assistance  but would  have  to register for  it  again  every
year  at  the  social  welfare  offices.  The  additional  advantage  would  be  that  the
beneficiary  list is always  up to date  and  leakage  is minimized.  Alternatively,  the
IDP  allowance  in  full  or  in  part  could  be  tied  to  participation  in  public  works
programs.
The  answer  to the  question  when  IDP  assistance  should  be  integrated  into  an overall
social assistance depends on the specifics  of the individual  situation a country finds itself in.
However, if a displacement problem is protracted, if there is widespread poverty in the rest of
the population,  and if the resources  channeled  to IDPs constitute  a large  share of the  social
welfare  budget  and if this budget  is unable  to cover  all vulnerable  groups  in society,  then
there  is a case to be made to integrate  the ID]P  assistance.  The challenge is to create a social
safety net  that,  while  addressing  the  special  vulnerability  of IDPs,  does  not  do that  at  the
expense  of other vulnerable  groups  in the  rest  of the population.  Furthermore,  apart from
targeting  inefficiencies,  distinct  IDP  assistance  at  the  expense  of  assistance  to  other
vulnerable  groups in society carries the additional political problem that it may drive a wedge
between  the  local  population  and  the  IDP  communities  and  create  alienation.  When
designing  a  system  of indicator  targeting,  certain  displacement-specific  indicators  could be
included,  for example whether a household lives in a collective center.
Demobilization, Veterans, and Disability
Demobilization  is  concerned  with  the  transition  of former  combatants  from  military  to
civilian life. It is crucial for two reasons. First, the precarious public finance situation dictates
a reduction  of armies  inflated  with  combatants  in wartimes  to  free  up  resources  for  other
pressing needs.  Second,  a reduction  in the size of armies is an important  step toward more
security;  it is a key first confidence-building  measure  between  two  former  warring parties.
But  it also  has security  implications  within the jurisdiction  of one party:  by  lowering  the
number of people under weapons  and by returning them to civilian life, the post-war situation
is stabilized.
The  Dayton  Peace  Accords  for  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  defines  demobilization  as
"removing  from  the  possession  of  these  personnel  all  weapons,  including  individual
weapons,  explosive  devices,  communications  equipment,  vehicles,  and  all  other  military
equipment. All personnel  belonging  to these Forces shall  be released from service  and shall
14 This reflects the three major poverty risk  factors in transition countries:  employment status,  age, and location
(World Bank 2000).
9not  engage  in  any  further  training  or  other  military  activities"  (General  Framework
Agreement  for Peace,  Annex 1  A, Article IV, 5b). However, this is only one part of the story.
The Challenge
The  lesson  from  demobilization  programs  throughout  the  world  is  that  demobilization  is  a
complex  exercise  in  that  programs  are  dependent  on  a  number  of  situation-specific
characteristics.  First,  it has to take  account of the background  and  identity of the  individual
soldiers  (llNDP  2000).  Age,  gender,  educational  background,  and  years  spent  in  service
influence  a  demobilization  program  as  much  as  whether  the  soldiers  are  professionals  or
freedom  fighters  or  whether  they  emerge  as  winners  or  losers  from  the  war.  Lastly,  such
programs are also dependent on the overall political  and security context in the country and the
willingness of combatants to become demobilized.  Successful  demobilization  addresses  these
issues and times assistance according to needs. No two demobilization programs are alike.
One  can  conceive  of assistance  for  veterans  as  a  means  of "buying"  support  for  the
peace  process  from  them.  Therefore,  a  successful  and  sustained  demobilization  process
requires,  beyond  collecting  weapons,  active  assistance  for former  combatants  to  adjust to
civilian  life.  If they for  example  fail  to  find  employment  and  stay isolated  in between  the
military  and  the civilian  sector without  having  access  to  either,  demobilization  can  easily
escalate  into  armed  troubles  or  the  return  of soldiers  to  banditry,  due  to  the  widespread
continued  availability  of  firearms  especially  among  former  combatants.  Here  is  a  key
challenge  for social  protection  in a post-war  setting:  to  help facilitate  the  former  soldiers'
transition  from  military  service  to  civil  employment.  Demobilization  has  important
implications for both labor markets and nascent  social safety net systems.
Labor markets: The key goal of successful demobilization is to help former combatants
re-integrate  into public life and enable  them to earn their living in the civilian labor market.
However,  due  to  outdated  skills  and  difficulties  in  adapting  to  civilian  life,  former
combatants  are  especially  disadvantaged  in  the  tight  post-war  labor markets  in  transition
countries.  This applies  in particular  to those former  soldiers  from lower ranks  who  already
had low levels  of skills and therefore difficulties  in the civilian labor market before the war.
There is a high likelihood, therefore, that former combatants will move  straight from duty to
long-term  unemployment.  As a result,  former  combatants  may become  dependent  on social
assistance, some form of humanitarian aid, or, if they qualify,  on veterans'  assistance.
Social assistance: In some countries, veterans'  assistance tends to constitute  a large part
of social assistance.  This is understandable  given the high vulnerability  of war veterans  and
especially  those  with  severe  disabilities.  There  often  is  a public  consensus  that those  who
have sacrificed a lot in defending their people should be adequately compensated and deserve
special  protection.  The  veterans'  case is  often pressed  by a powerful  lobby,  and politicians
realize that it is politically opportune to yield to that pressure--not  least to show their patriotic
credentials.  However,  very  often the  scope of benefits and services  do not match the public
funds  available.  Furthermore,  categories  of entitlements  often  tend to  be  wide  and  spread
further with time. Families of fallen soldiers  often become  entirely dependent  on government
assistance, because the wives now heading the households  are unable to work.
Pensions:  Often  the  veteran  pension  system  is  run  separately  from  the  civilian  one,
which  is  inefficient.  Likewise,  veteran  pensions  tend  to  be  unsustainably  high  and
unaffordable.  Furthermore,  demographic  change due to a shrinking of the male working-age
10population  through  combat-induced  death  and  disability  can  have  a  severe  impact  on  the
sustainability of pay-as-you-go  pension  systems.  Together with low contribution  collection
the worsening  ratio of contributors  to pensioners  complicate  pension  reform  by  leading to
problems of liquidity and payment arrears.
Policy  Options
Social protection should be concerned  with helping those former combatants who are able to
work to find employment and with providing those who cannot with a social safety net. As a
first  start,  while  soldiers  are  awaiting  discharge,  the  authorities  in  charge  of  the
demobilization  program  need to survey  individual  needs  and  backgrounds  so  as to provide
the right kind of assistance to every soldier.
Reinsertion: In the  following  reinsertion  phase,  former  combatants  should  be  supplied
with a transitory  "safety net package"  in form  of cash, vouchers,  or in kind transfers  such as
shelter  or  food  to  bridge  the  gap  between  demobilization  and  reintegration.  However,  in
practice, this reinsertion support takes the form of a veterans'  benefit that is not limited in time
and  given  out  regardless  of whether  the  individual  is  able  to  work  or  not.  This  leads  to
veterans'  assistance schemes that are both massive in size and in administrative requirements.
a  Differentiating veterans' assistance according to  need:  By  adapting  across-the-
board  veterans'  assistance,  the  government  can  give  useful  incentives  to  able-
bodied  veterans  to  become  self-reliant.  For instance,  the  availability  of veterans'
assistance  to  those  who  are  able  to  work  could  be  shortened  to  cover  only  the
reinsertion period. A one-time lump sum of about 12-to-24-months  worth of benefit
could  be given  out to bridge  the  gap  from military  to  civilian  employment  or to
provide  starting  capital  for  self-employment  (Gregson  2000).  While  many (partly)
disabled would not be able to work in manufacturing,  they may very well be able to
do  a service job.  Full and  generous  veterans'  assistance  should then be  limited to
those who are severely  disabled  and unable to  work.  The availability  of veterans'
assistance  should,  therefore,  be  tied  to  need  and  not  to  entitlement  due  to  past
service per se. Veterans  able to work should, however,  still be able to access social
services such as counseling and advisory services.
*  Social services: War veterans  require,  on top of material  support,  special  advisory
and  counseling  services  to help  them  deal  with  post-traumatic  stress  disorder and
other psychological  problems  stemnming  from their combat  experience,  in order to
facilitate reintegration into civilian life and their families.
Reintegration: Successful  reintegration  of able-bodied  veterans  implies  reintegration
into  the  workforce.  It  therefore  relies  on  providing  an  individual  with  the  right  skills  to
improve his or her chances to find employment.'5
*  Employment-generation:  Former  combatants  require  special  support  in  finding
employment.  This includes  training  programs  to update  their skills or generate  new
and  needed ones, while job  information  and the provision of contacts  can also  help.
Furthermore,  there is scope  for the  government providing incentives  for prospective
'5However,  successful  reintegration  is also  dependent  on  influences  outside social  protection,  such as  a quick
return to economic growth.
1  1employers to hire demobilized soldiers, like short-term contracts that are exempt from
payroll  taxes.  Furthermore,  social-fund  operations  could  be geared  toward  focusing
on  employing  former  combatants.  An  example  for  supporting  the  reintegration
process  is a  labor redeployment  project  in Bosnia and Herzegovina,  which  finances
counseling and employment and training services for demobilized soldiers.'6
*  Back to school for the young generation: War and mobilization often drags  young
and  gifted people  out of education.  In order  to  give them a  well-deserved  second
chance but also to raise the country's human capital, there is a good case to be made
for  providing  scholarships  for  higher  and  further  education  especially  aimed  at
young former combatants.
Disability: Disabled  veterans  usually  receive,  apart  from  their  situation-specific
requirements  (such  as  for  psychological  treatment),  higher benefits  than  disabled  civilians.
While  aligning  benefit  levels  may  not  be  possible  for  political  reasons,  civilian  disabled
should not be treated as a second class.
*  Simplified and integrated  disability criteria:  In order to make the system both fairer
and  more  efficient,  disabled  people  should  be  awarded  assistance  regardless  of
whether they  are  civilian or veterans  or whether  their disability  is war-induced  or
not.  Likewise,  disability  criteria  should  be  simple  and applicable  to both  disabled
civilian and veterans.  Disability categories  should be clear and limited in number to
avoid  confusion.  Moreover,  unlike  the  current  practice  in  many  post-conflict
transition  countries,  the  benefits  should  be  disbursed  through  one  source,  most
likely  the  social  welfare  ministry  to  avoid  "double-dipping"  and  to  cut  back  on
administrative  expenditure.
*  Disability-centered training and rehabilitation: Disabled  with  both  military  and
civilian  backgrounds  should  benefit  from  integrated  rehabilitation  and  training
programs  so as to enable them to participate  fully in public life and become as self-
reliant as possible.
Women
War changes the role of women in society. First, women take over responsibilities of heading
the  households  during  the  war,  while  men  are  away  on  military  duty.  Second,  combat
casualties  among  the  male  working-age  population  significantly  change  gender
demographics.' 7 Women are left assuming a new role as the productive  base for restarting the
economy and as provider for the family. Likewise,  there is evidence  that women often adapt
more readily to stresses  of the post-war life than men and therefore  take over responsibility
for  income  generation  when  the  men  do  not  (Buck  2000).  However,  the  changed  role  of
women in society  can have  a productive  impact on the  peace process.  Women typically  are
more likely to act as agents for change and in the rebuilding of social capital.
16 Bosnia and Herzegovina Pilot Emergency Labor Redeployment Project
17 However,  households can be female-headed  not only because of the husband's death but also because of war-
induced family disintegration, for example  when the spouses are from different ethnic groups.
12The Challenge
A number of challenges for social protection emerge to take account of special vulnerabilities
of women and to strengthen their role.
Labor market: War-induced  demographic  change raises the share of women  in the labor
market  and leave many  women in the role of the provider for the  family. However,  women
often are disadvantaged  in the labor market both in term of finding employment and in terms
of wages they receive.  This can  drive labor market  segmentation.  For instance  in Georgia,
female IDPs predominantly run unofficial  small-scale trading activities (Buck 2000).
Social assistance: Women  face the often-impossible  task of balancing  both  caring for
children and generating income to feed them. As a result of this and their disadvantage  in the
labor  market,  female-headed  households  are  more  likely  to  be  reliant  on  public  social
assistance  and support from other, third sector sources.  This is especially  the case for those
female-headed  households  who  are  suffering  from  displacement  and  the  associated
disadvantage  in accessing other coping  mechanisms.  Women can be subject to very  special
war atrocities such as rape, trafficking, and domestic violence.
Policy  Options
Social  protection  has  to  take  account  of  the  changing  role  of women  in  post-conflict
societies.  There  is a need both to  improve  their chances  in the labor market and to provide
well-targeted assistance to those who are unable to act both as caregiver and income-provider
for the family at the same time.
*  Skills  training and employability:  Women  should  benefit  from  specialized  skills
training  taking account of their needs  and strengths to enhance  their chances  in the
labor market.  Other interventions  airned at raising women's employability  and self-
reliance  include for example targeted microcredit programs.
*  Social assistance targeting: If the social assistance  system operates with categorical
targeting for cash benefits,  female-headed households  should be one such category
to take account of their higher likelihood of poverty.
*  Social services  should  offer  female-specific  counseling  and  advisory  programs
targeted  at  the  special  vulnerabilities  among  women.  These  services  need  to  be
offered  in a  consistent  way across  ihe country,  and  social  workers  should receive
special training to enable them to offer these services.
*  Participation:  Social fund operations  should ensure  that women's voices are heard
at all stages of a project and take account of their needs as well as take advantage of
their special role in the building of social capital.
Children and Young People
War has  a profound  impact on young people.  While it is beyond  the scope of this paper to
analyze its extent and nature, there are a few important aspects from a social protection point
of view.The Challenge
Young people, both children and young adults, are particularly affected  by the disruptions of
war. Very often their upbringing  and  socialization are  impeded;  for example,  life during the
siege of Sarajevo  was isolated, and  many young people  suffered from "backwardness"  once
they were able  again to engage with their peers from other countries.
Loss of years of schooling: Mobilization and the overall  circumstances  in war severely
disrupt  the  education  of young  people.  Military  service  means  that  schooling  or  higher
education  is  interrupted  or  put  off indefinitely,  while  a  lack  of heating,  electricity,  and
material or the severity of the fighting renders meaningful school instruction impossible. As a
result,  there  is  a  danger  that  war  leaves  one  generation  with  insufficient  skills  (and
pronounced  traumata),  which, if not addressed,  may leave  them dependent  on some  kind of
social assistance  for their entire life.
Youngformer  soldiers  may face great  difficulties in dealing with the trauma and stress
stemming  from  experiences  in  battle  and  have  particular  problems  in  reintegrating  into
civilian life.
War orphans and children from  dysfunctional families:  Furthermore,  war  leaves  an
enhanced  number  of children  without  (adequate)  parental  care,  which  the  social  welfare
system  has  to  accommodate  at  a  time  when  it  is  severely  ill  prepared  to  do  so.
Institutionalized  care  tends  to  suffer  from  low  funds  and  may  represent  an  outdated,
communist  approach,  while  foster care and  adoption remains unaffordable  for many  people
and social  services  are underdeveloped.  In a post-war  situation there is a particular  risk that
children end up on the street when timely support is not provided.
The  notion  of war  taking  youth's  best  years  is  evident  in  many  ways.  However,
precisely  because  of  this  sense  of loss,  young  people  can  become  important  pro-peace
process driving forces.  They may want to avoid perceived mistakes of their parent generation
or just strive to return to normality  as quickly  as possible.  Special  support  for them is a key
challenge also in the light of political economy and peace strategy considerations.
Policy Options
*  Skills enhancement and know-how transfer: The  need  for additional  schooling  for
young  demobilized  soldiers  has  been  mentioned  above.  Moreover,  special  skill
training with a focus on newly developed technologies  and job profiles  not only can
improve young  people's chances  in the labor market but turn them  into leaders  in
the resumption of economic activity.  Young people may be more prone to start their
own businesses if they are supplied with the right skills and know-how.
*  Innovative approach to  child welfare: Support  for  children  deprived  of parental
care  has  to  be  based on  de-institutionalization  tied  to  community  integration,  on
improvements  in environment  and incentives for prospective  foster caregivers,  and
on  supporting  existing  intra-family  coping  mechanisms.  Usually  the  extended
family  is  the  first  instance  to  take  care  of a  child  without  parents,  and  specially
targeted financial and advisory support for those families may enable them to afford
caring  for  a  child  long-term.  There  is  an  urgent  need  to  improve  and  specialize
advice  and  counseling  to  dysfunctional  families  so  as  to prevent  children  from
having to rely on foster or institutionalized  care.
14*  Counseling for young people  and children:  Children  need  special  advice  and
support to help them overcome war.-induced trauma and stress so as to enable them
to  make  the  best  out  of their  post-war  opportunities.  The  same  applies  to  very
young  former  combatants.  Social  services  should  therefore  offer  counseling
programs especially targeted for them.
*  Leadership skills:  Social  funds  should  examine  how  they  can  foster  the  young
generation's  participation  and  their  role  in  leading  their  communities  and
developing  social  capital.  Furthermore,  if projects are "owned"  by the young,  their
sustainability  is more secure long-term.
Humanitarian  Aid and Its Phasing Out
During war a  significant  share  of the  population tends  to  live on  humanitarian  emergency
assistance.  For example,  by the  end of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina,  about 80 percent
of the population was at least partly dependent  on emergency food aid and medical and other
supplies from international  humanitarian aid organizations  (World Bank  1996).
The Challenge
Despite  improvements  in food  supply  and  declining  prices  resulting  from  a resumption  of
commercial  transport  and receding  obstacles  to trade  after the  cessation of hostilities,  many
people  will  remain  vulnerable  and  dependent  on  humanitarian  assistance  at  least  initially.
This dependency  owes to their limited purchasing power and will only decrease when people
can return to their old jobs, find new ones, or when alternative  assistance mechanisms  are in
place.  Most aid agencies  do not terminate  operations  as a ceasefire  is in place,  but continue
their projects over  a  few years  if needed.  However,  while  some  aid  organizations  continue
operating  humanitarian  projects  such as  soup kitchen  or the distribution  of food parcels for
the very vulnerable,  most either increasingly shift activities more into the development  sector
or withdraw entirely at some point.1 8 Phasing out of emergency humanitarian  aid can lead to
a shock,  especially  in countries  where  a  big part of the population  relies  on it.  Therefore,
social safety net design after the  end of violence  has to be mindful  of the role of emergency
humanitarian assistance plays and what happens once it is phased out.
Social Assistance:  While  the  majority  of the  population  is  usually  able  to  substitute
emergency  humanitarian  aid  with  income  from  employment  and  other  economic  activity
once the security situation allows, there always remain vulnerable  groups who are not able to
participate  in  income  generation.  The  key  challenge  for  the  nascent  social  safety  net  is,
therefore,  that it will have to fill many of the gaps left by phased-out humanitarian aid.
Policy  Options
It is important  that the government,  the  international  funding bodies,  and the  implementing
partners  start  early  with planning  the transition  from  emergency  humanitarian  aid  to more
long-term  development  assistance  and  a  stronger  role  of  the  state  in  providing  social
assistance.
I  However,  refugees,  who  usually  are  precluded  from  participating  in income-generation  activities,  remain
more  or less entirely dependent  on humanitarian  aid. Therefore,  often a humanitarian  aid infrastructure  remains
in place  as  long  as  refugees  are  being  hosted  in a second  country  (Croatia  and  refugees  from  Bosnia  and
Herzegovina  is  a case in  point).
15*  The social safety net takes over: Over  time, the  public  social  safety  net  will  take
over  many,  if  not  all,  functions  humanitarian  assistance  fulfilled  during  and
immediately  after  the  war.  Vulnerability  criteria  that  were  in  use  by  the
humanitarian  organization  should be studied by the  social safety net designers and,
if possible  and  sensible,  could form  the  core  of the  new vulnerability  criteria  for
social  assistance.  Especially  when  relying  on  indicator  targeting  (as  will  be
probably  be  the  case  in  every  transition  country  emerging  from  conflict),  the
experience and criteria of humanitarian operations can be of help. A donor-financed
emergency  social  fund  to  provide  targeted  cash  benefits  to  the  most  vulnerable
could bridge the gap between humanitarian aid and the creation of a sustainable and
effective social safety net.'9
*  Continued interaction with  the third sector: The  legacy  of the  humanitarian  aid
intervention during  conflict  is a growing openness  of the former communist public
system  to  dealing  with  nongovernmental  and  third-sector  agents.  In  the  former
Yugoslav republics, the Centers for Social Works, the main social  services delivery
mechanism before the war, were  used for the distribution of humanitarian  aid.  This
new openness  toward interaction  should be preserved and built upon,  for example
with regard to public-private  cooperation  in social service  delivery.  Operating soup
kitchens  to  help  the  very  vulnerable  is  a  possibility  for  a  (local)  NGO  to
complement  the  state  social  safety  net.  In  the  Bosnian  cities  of  Travnik  and
Prijedor,  municipal  welfare  boards  bring  local  government  and  third  sector
organizations  together  to  determine  the  local  needs  for  assistance  and to  develop
joint  strategies  to  meet  them.  However,  the  share  of third  sector  involvement  in
social welfare delivery is heavily dependent also on the overall operating conditions
for NGOs.  In order  to foster NGO  involvement  the  state  should  provide  the  right
incentives,  for  example  by  adopting  a  hands-off  approach  by  facilitating  NGO
registration procedures and exempting pro bono NGOs from paying taxes.20
*  Further aligning humanitarian assistance and development aid: This  is  a  long
discussed  yet  unresolved  issue  in  post-conflict  reconstruction.  The  gap  between
humanitarian  and  development  aid  is  difficult to  bridge  for  a  number  of reasons.
First,  the  culture  and  attitudes  within  organizations  in  the two  different  fields  is
traditionally  different,  and  problems  are  being  approached  in  different  ways.
Second,  the  organizational  structures  and  circumstances  are  different:  operational
timeframes  for humanitarian aid are much  shorter than those  for  development  aid.
However, these  problems are  being overcome through encouraging  more  exchange
of staff between humanitarian  and  development  organizations,  while  budget lines
are being further aligned. For example, the European Community Humanitarian  Aid
Office,  the  European  Union's  funding  arm  for humanitarian  aid,  operates  budget
lines of up to  18 months  for nonemergency  humanitarian aid.2 '  In  some cases  the
United  Nations'  World  Food  Program  is  linking  food  aid  with  more  long-term
developmental  activities (see box  1).  Likewise, many NGOs have begun to build up
expertise  and  operate  in  both  fields.  Often  the same  NGOs shift  their operations
from emergency  humanitarian aid to development  assistance  in the course  of post-
19  For example,  such  a  fund was  part of the  World  Bank's  1996  Emergency  Recovery  Project  in  Bosnia and
Herzegovina (World Bank 1996).
20  The  pro  bono  distinction  is  necessary,  because  in  transition  countries  one  can  often  find  many  private
organizations calling themselves NGOs,  however without pursuing any pro bono activities.
21  Budget lines for the European Community Humanitarian  Aid Office's extreme emergency aid remain at three
to six months.
16conflict  reconstruction.  For  example,  organizations  like  the  Danish  Refugee
Council  or the Norwegian  Refugee  Council both provide  emergency  food  aid and
run  microcredit  and  income-generation  projects  to  support  the  self-reliance  of
displaced persons.
Box 1: Linking Humanitarian Aid and Development:  Food-for-Work  Projects of the World Food
Program in the Southern Caucasus
Although the mandate of the United Nations'  World Food Program (WFP) is limited to ensure food security and
to fight  hunger  in  the  world  by supplying  emergency  humanitarian  food  aid,  the  organization  has  also  been
venturing  into more  developmental territory  over the last few years.  With Food-for-Work  (FFW)  activities the
WFP is trying to link food supply with infrastructure rehabilitation  to raise agricultural productivity.
In FFW projects people receive  food  in exchange for participating in activities such as land irrigation and
drainage rehabilitation  and bridge and road repair. The goal is  to enable local communities  to better use existing
land  and  foster  self-reliance  through  small-scale  agriculture  as  a main  coping  mechanism.  However,  FFW
projects  sometimes  also  cover  nonagricultural  activities  such  as  school  rehabilitation  or engaging  people  in
agricultural  training activities.  The food can  either be  distributed to individual families  or be used for example
in  soup kitchens for old people.
In what is similar to typical social  fund practice, the WFP initially conducts an awareness campaign in the
designated  areas  and  holds  open  community  meetings.  Local  authorities  then  come  up  with  proposals  and
beneficiary  lists that are assessed by WFP staff. The criteria for assistance are both nutritional and rehabilitation
needs. Upon signing  a project agreement  with the WFP, the local authorities  are responsible  for providing  the
labor,  security,  and  most  of the  material.  Food  is being  disbursed  upon  the  achievement  of predetermined
benchmarks,  and the WFP monitors closely.
Even years after the violence in Armenia,  Azerbaijan, and  Georgia, there is still more demand than can be
met in the three countries.  Only after other sources of cash income  for households become available,  demand is
likely  to  fall.  At  the  same  time,  FFW  activities  are  limited  in scope  in that  most  of the  input  for  the
reconstruction  work has  to be  supplied  by the  local authorities  themselves,  because  the  WFP has virtually no
budget for that. However, other workfare programs can pick up from where FFW reaches its limits, for example
by paying workers in cash and by making more extensive reconstruction  material available.
Statistical Data Collection
War can leave  a country both without reliable poverty data and without a functioning system to
collect them.  Pre-war pension contribution  data  may get destroyed or be inaccessible  because
of remaining  frontlines.  Likewise,  previously collected poverty  data is made  obsolete by war,
because  poverty  profiles  change  and  new vulnerable  groups  emerge.  More  importantly,  war
can  destroy  previous  statistical  office  structures  or  remaining  frontlines  may  render  the
collection  and  exchange  of countrywide  data impossible in the immediate  aftermath  of war.
However,  reliable  poverty  data  and  social  indicators  are  essential,  once  the  overwhelming
demand  for assistance of wartime  recedes.  In light of very narrow  funds  available  for social
welfare  and the associated need  for precise  targeting,  an accurate  statistical  poverty profile  is
essential. In particular, this is a necessary precondition  for the politically delicate setting up of a
transparent system based on interethnic  social redistribution.
*  Restart of statistical  office operations: A key priority is to get the statistical  office
operative again to restore  statistical data collection  and evaluation  capacities.  This
requires some  degree of technical  amd financial  support from donors.  In particular,
17if the conflict leads to the emergence of two separate entities, there may be the need
to design a statistical office infrastructure  from scratch.
*  Data exchange: Where  the political  status quo does not allow the introduction of a
countrywide  statistical  data  collection  infrastructure,  the  various  actors  should
ensure  that  they  at  least  ensure  unimpeded  data  flow  across  regions  and
subdivisions  so  as to  produce  a consistent  poverty  and  social profile  of the entire
country and to avoid double-counting in data-reporting  systems.
*  Resumption of statistical data collection:  Donor-financed  and  -supported  social
and poverty  assessments  should serve  as the basis for  creating transparent  systems
of redistribution.
Corruption, State Capture, and the Unofficial Economy
Transition  countries  in  general  fight  with  pronounced  problems  of corruption  and  state
capture.  War and the associated  heightened  degree of anarchy tend to exacerbate  this. First,
fighting corruption has hardly been high on the agenda of post-communist  nationalist leaders
in  the  climate  of increasing  ethnic  tensions.  Second,  war  creates  a  state  of lawlessness  in
which corruption  and  illegal economic  activity  are  usually used to  finance the war effort as
well as bolster the coffers of those leading it.
The Challenge
A  large informal sector:  Corruption  and  state capture  thrive  on underdevelopment,  a weak
civil society, and the absence of the rule of law. However,  the causality moves the other way
round as well.  In the face of prohibitive  taxes and regulation,  complemented  by the need to
bribe officials in return for state approval;  businesses face a strong disincentive to operate in
the  formal  sector.  Continuing  political  control  of economic  activity  is  particularly  bad  for
small business formation,  which is the key driving force of growth in transition.  As a result,
much  of  economic  activity  takes  place  in  the  informal  sector  (Johnson,  Kaufmann  and
Shleifer  1997).  Indeed,  as  table  3  shows,  the  unofficial  economy  in  war-affected  and
corruption-prone  Azerbaijan and Georgia is significantly larger than elsewhere  in the region.
However,  informal  economic  activity  does  not necessarily  prevent  corruption.  While
firms  avoid paying  taxes and complying  with regulations,  they may still have to pay bribes.
Moreover,  when  operating  outside  the  official  realm,  they  have  to  rely  on  protection  of
private and  sometimes criminal agents  and are thus constantly walking the thin line between
criminal  and  noncriminal  activities  (Johnson,  Kaufmann  and  Shleifer  1997).  This  is
especially  the case in a post-conflict  situation,  where  security is in question and public  law
enforcement underdeveloped.
A  negative  effect  on  public finances:  The  size  of  the  unofficial  economy  has  an
important  effect  on public  finances  and the  strength  and ability  of government  to  provide
public goods such as law enforcement or a social safety net. First, much of economic activity
and  employment  does  not  generate  tax  income.  As  a  result,  low  tax  collection  and  low
contributions to the pension  fund and other  forms of social  insurance  (if they operate  at all)
put the sustainability of the social safety net in doubt. Second,  a lack of scrutiny also induces
a nontransparent way of handling  public finances:  the whereabouts of those limited amounts
of taxes collected often remain unaccounted for and raises deep public skepticism against the
government  as a useful actor to assist people in need.
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Policy Options
Sustainable  social safety net reform relies on improving public finances  and  on making  the
tax collection and budgeting process more transparent.  This implies the need to rid a country
of rampant corruption associated with a post-war environment.  While fighting corruption  and
state  capture  lies outside of social  protection realm,  there  are certain implications  for social
protection.22
*  Hands off informal activity in the short run: Over time, not least  in the  interest  of
improving  public  finances,  much  of the  economic  activity  taking  place  in  the
informal sector has to move to the formal sector. In the short run, however,  cracking
down  on  informal  activity  may  be  counterproductive,  because  this  may  push
especially small  and medium-sized businesses  out of business. The outcome of this
would be less, not more employment.2 3
*  New  actors: In  the  light  of  corruption  and  state  capture,  there  is  a  case  for
attempting  to  introduce  a  social  safety  net  that  relies  on  new  actors  instead  of
reviving  the  old  redistributive  statist  social  welfare  system.  For  example,  by
introducing  more third  sector  engagement in supporting the vulnerable,  inefficient
and corrupt state administrations  can be circumvented.  Likewise, empowering local
communities  and  driving  decentralization  with  extended  use of social  fund-type
operations  will  foster  democratization  civil  society.  A strengthened  civil  society
will  lead  to more  scrutiny of the  government record  and the political environment
will be less conducive  to corruption.
*  Building social capital: In the  light of corruption of central  and local  government
and  state  capture,  empowering  local  communities  becomes  an  essential  part  of
social safety net reform.  There are a number of potential projects aimed at restoring
social  capital, such as social funds and community development  projects, which are
being  used  and  should  be  used  in  a  post-war  envirornent.  War  does  not
automatically  destroy  social capital,  but it can transform  it.  Sometimes, war brings
communities  closer  together  to  cleal  with  an  adverse  environment  together.
22 One of the most important responses,  legal reform,  lies outside the realm of social protection.
23 The implicit assumption here  is that the "replacement wage"  from  informal employment  is no impediment to
the development of formal labor markets. This may not hold for some very lucrative criminal activity.
19However, in a first step, the intra-family bonds tend to be strengthened  for example
by the  pooling of resources,  which can happen at the cost of community cohesion.
This is especially  the case in clan societies.  A post-war environment may require  a
different kind of social  fabric than that of a war. For  instance, while having coped
well  with  war  within  a  family,  post-war  reconstruction  requires  cooperation  and
empowerment  of  communities  across  family  lines.  Sometimes  war  leaves
communities  in shock and too lethargic to respond to the immediate reconstruction
needs.  Social  fund projects  need  to be  designed such  as to generate  the  necessary
minimum  of social  and  organizational  capital  and  build  it  along  the  way  (for
example, by making use of the demonstration effect and through leaming by doing).
IV. The Challenges  and Implications for Social  Protection: Constraints
Related  to Ethnic Tensions
While the outcomes of conflict as portrayed in previous sections have an impact on the depth
of the  crisis,  they  do  not  necessarily  affect  the  design  of the  social  safety  net.  War  and
destruction  of physical,  human,  and  social  capital  worsen  the  situation  by  raising  the
vulnerability  of the population  and lowering the  state's ability to confront  it, but essentially
the social protection  mechanisms  remain the same. This changes when constraints related  to
the ethnic nature of conflict are brought in.
Post-War Interethnic Tensions
In some countries,  such as Armenia and Azerbaijan,  conflict has led to  a complete separation
of the two ethnic groups,  and, because return is increasingly  improbable, this separation may
remain.  However,  there  are  also  cases  where  there  is  some  refugee  and  IDP return,  where
ethnic  minorities  remain  in  one  jurisdiction  or  where,  following  a peace  agreement,  two
former  warring  ethnic  groups  are  lumped together.24 There  are  two possible  outcomes:  (i)
within  one  jurisdiction  two  ethnic  groups  entertain  their  own  distinct  political  institutions
instead  of merging  them  into  one  and  (ii)  ethnic  minorities  remain  disadvantaged  and
discriminated  against and  lack their own representation.  In either situation  continuing ethnic
tensions,  based  on  the  experiences  and  grievances  of the  war,  provide  another  set  of
constraints to social  safety net design, in that they make any form of interethnic redistribution
and cross-subsidies difficult to implement.
The Challenge
The unpopularity of  interethnic redistribution: In shared jurisdictions there may be pressure
to decentralize  both tax  collection  and  social  protection  to the  regional  or even  municipal
level where ethnic homogeneity is highest,  so as to avoid having to share funds with the other
ethnic group. Ethnic groups that do not want to share funds with the former enemy will resist
any attempt to introduce  a statewide  social protection  system and  cross-subsidies  or to take
ethnic minority needs into account.  Bosnia and Herzegovina  is a case in point, where  to date
both Bosnian Croats  and Bosnians  operate separate  pension  systems  (see  box 2)  and where
24  Examples  for the  first  case  are the  Gali  district  in  Abkhazia,  which  has  seen  a  number  of waves  of IDP
returnees from the other side  of the front line. The  latter case  is exemplified by the Bosnian-Croat Federation in
Bosnia and Herzegovina.
20social  welfare  provision is devolved to the lowest layers of government.25 In other countries,
government  authority  in  the  regions  is  limited,  and  local  leaders  collect  taxes  with  no
intention of passing them on to the central government.26
Box 2: Three Separate Pension Systems  in Bosnia and Herzegovina
The constitutional  framework of the Dayton  Peace Accord divides the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina into two
entities,  the  Bosnian-Croat Federation  (FBH)  and the  Republika  Srpska  (RS).  As a result of this,  the country
emerged  from the  war  with more than  one pension  system.  However,  Bosnia  and Herzegovina  today has not
only  two  but three  separate  system:  one  in  the  RS  and  two  in  the  FBH,  the  former countrywide  system  in
Sarajevo used by the Bosnians  and a Croat one based  in Mostar.  More than  six years  after the federation  was
created,  ethnic tensions  and political differences  still make the  integration of the Mostar  and the Sarajevo funds
impossible. Even worse, until recently the pre-war earnings  records centralized  in Sarajevo  were not accessible
for the Mostar and the  RS pension funds, and they were  awarding pensions either based on earnings proxies or
as flat benefits.
In March 2000, the three pension funds signed an agreement to improve the exchange and coordination of
data,  such  as  contributor  history  information.  It  is  a precondition  for moving  on to awarding  differentiated
pensions  based on  actual  individual contributions.  It furthermore helps track those people who  have registered
illegally  for two  pensions and  facilitates  IDP  return by allowing  returnees to continue  receiving  their pension
from the  same  fund regardless  of their place  of residence.  As  a  basis  for this,  the FBH  and  RS  post banks
introduced  a mechanism  enabling  pension  funds to send  pensions through  local  post offices to the recipients
across entity lines.
However,  while this is an important step toward normalizing relations between the entity pension funds,  it
falls  short of what  is desirable  for the  federation,  namely  the  integration  of both the Sarajevo  and  the Mostar
funds, which is still being resisted.
This kind of uncoordinated  decentralization  may even  hinder the development of a consistent  approach to
social  safety  net  design  within  ethnically  homogeneous  parts  of the  country.  This  can  result  in  different
ministries  being responsible  for planning and implementing  social welfare  measures, and  it may prevent a clear
prioritization  of those  measures  and lead  to leakage  and "double-dipping."27 If anything,  poverty may  end up
being  fought  inconsistently  even  within  one  ethnic  group,  resources  are  not  used  efficiently  and,  worse,
different levels of poverty across the country  become engrained.
Pensions  and social  assistance:  Traditional  solidarity  mechanisms  reaching  across
ethnic  lines  may  simply  be  politically  unacceptable  to  the  electorates.  Taxpayers  and
pension-contributors  may feel uneasy about benefits being paid out to fonner enemies from a
budget or fund they have been contributing  to. In the case of the former Yugoslav republics,
a  pre-war  system  of  interethnic  redistribution  that  was  perceived  as  unfair  eventually
contributed to the disintegration of the country and the outbreak of hostilities.
Potential threat to  the  peace process:  Post-conflict  situations  can  be  distinguished
between those in which peace appears durable  and those where peace  is fragile or where there
25 Bosnian Croats push for further decentralization  of responsibilities  in the social welfare sphere to lower levels
of  government,  such  as  cantons  and  municipalities,  where  both  income  levels  and  ethnicity  are  more
homogeneous.  The  Bosnians,  who  are  overall  worse  off than  the  Croats,  instead  want to  strengthen  service
delivery and revenue  collection  on the federation  level  so as to allow  them to ensure  cross  subsidies  (Fox and
Wallich  1997).
26 For  example,  although not of an ethnic nature,  the conflict between  the Georgian  region of Adjara and  the
central government  in Tbilisi has led to Adjara not passing on taxes but rather demanding extra payments  from
the central budget.
27 Not surprisingly,  the case of the FBH exemplifies this.
21are widespread perceptions that even changes to a peace deal  are possible.28 As long as peace
remains fragile  and a resumption  of violence  is possible  and cooperation  between  two ethnic
groups  is  minimal,  the  introduction  of integrated  social  protection  systems  and  interethnic
solidarity  mechanisms  may not  only be politically  unviable  but can even become  dangerous;
policies of redistribution  from one ethnic group to the other can increase the likelihood of new
conflict  in  that  one  group  may  perceive  that  they  are  unfairly  taxed  to  support  the  former
enemy.  Here  a post-conflict  situation can  quickly  become a pre-conflict  situation.  If a peace
settlement has been imposed by the outside world,  either through political  or military pressure
or by purchasing peace with the promise of massive international  aid, the public acceptance  of
peace may be low and cross-subsidies  all but impossible to "sell."
Decentralization leading fragmented risk pools: Inevitably,  this  decentralization  of
social safety  nets to  small and  ethnically homogeneous  subdivisions  within one jurisdiction
will  lead  to  fragmented  risk  pools.  Poor  subdivisions  will  end  up with  insufficient  social
protection,  and  social  safety  nets  are  not  an  adequate  instrument  anymore  to  deal  with
deepening  regional poverty.  A lack of communication between  different pension funds  may
result  in "double-dipping":  in the  administrative  turmoil  in the aftermath of ethnic conflict
pensioners  (especially  those  who  have  relocated  during the  war)  register  illegally  for  two
pensions from two different pension funds.
It  is  obvious  that  this  kind  of  decentralization  is  very  different  from  that  which  is
championed as a way to reform post-communist administrations  elsewhere in Eastern
Europe  and  Central  Asia  to  take  decisionmaking  and  implementation  closer  to  the
people.  The key difference  is that  it does  not  follow  a well-designed  plan that  involves  all
layers of government and ensures that central  government retains a role in policy design and
coordination.  Instead,  subdivisions  effectively  decide  to  ignore  a weak  central  government
structure and take matters into their own hands.
Labor markets: Continuing  ethnic tension are highly likely to lead to discrimination  in
the  labor  market  against  ethnic  minorities.  Apart  from  leaving  members  of the  minority
ethnic  group facing a higher likelihood of unemployment and therefore poverty, this leads to
labor  market  segmentation,  because  in  the  absence  of opportunities  in  the  formal  labor
market ethnic minorities may have little other option but self-employment.
Socialfunds or community-driven development: The crisis of the state in fulfilling  its
role  as  a  provider  of social  welfare  in  the  face  of conflict-related  constraints  makes  the
concept  of community-driven  development  and  in  particular  social  investment  funds  an
attractive  tool. Social  funds are very adaptable to different  situations and can be designed  to
meet  the  special  post-war  requirements,  such  as  infrastructure  rehabilitation,  employment
generation,  assistance  with  decentralization,  or  the  empowerment  of  local  communities.
2S An example  of the first case is Croatia,  where peace is durable,  a return to violence  very unlikely,  and where
the  public,  both  Croatian  and  Serb,  does  not perceive  any  likelihood  of changes  to  the nature  of the  peace
settlement.  The  second  type  is  exemplified  by  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  where  continued  substantial
disagreement  between  Bosnian Croats  and Bosnians  over the  implementation  of the federation  create threats to
the peace process and may make a resumption of hostilities possible.  Many Croats, at least, believe that the final
word  on the status of the  federation has not been  spoken and that  a rewriting  of the Dayton  Peace Agreement
could provide  them with  their own  ethnically homogeneous  entity.  As a result, their willingness  to create joint
institutions is limited.
22Furthermore,  social funds have sometimes been hailed as a tool to build bridges between two
ethnic groups formerly at war. Indeed, in case of the Kosovo Community Development Fund,
the  building  of intrerethnic  bridges  has  been added  to  the goals of the  project.  As will  be
shown, however, this may not be universally  the  case and the workability  of social funds  is
tainted by ethnic tension constraints.
Interethnic tensions and targeting: The  question  here  is whether  social  funds by their
design actually manage to target the most vulnerable regardless of their ethnic background. Is
community-based  social  welfare  really  doing  a  better  job  at  reaching  across  the  ethnic
divide? There  is no reason to believe that local  and community leaders will be less driven by
ethnic concerns and policies of nationalism  and ethnic hatred than those on the national level.
Social funds may actually fail deliver in two different ways. First, proposals for road repair in
a  village  may  leave  out  those  streets  leading  to  minority  houses,  regardless  of need.  The
village  leadership may just ignore the needs of the minority.  Second and even  worse,  entire
minority  communities  may  be  left  out:  a  mono-ethnically-run  social  fund  may  disregard
proposals from ethnic minority communities.
Alternatively,  proposals  from  ethnic  minority  villages  may  not be  forthcoming  in  the
first place, because they do not expect to gain support from a social  fund run entirely by the
other, majority ethnic group. For instance,  in Kosovo there is little scope  for Serbian villages
to  benefit  from  the  Kosovo  social  fund  in  a  situation  where  Albanian  social  fund  staff
actually  avoid visiting  Serbian villages  on security  grounds.  Furthermore,  social funds  may
not only fail to mitigate entitlement  failure and social exclusion on ethnic grounds but rather
foster separation and fuel  conflict. Certain infrastructure  intervention  may for instance  rather
help  to  segregate  communities  than  to  knit  them  together.  Likewise,  a  perceived  unfair
treatment from social fund officials may deepen suspicions on the minority side.
The  longer term: Therefore,  the  expectation  that a  social  fund  may  bridge  the ethnic
divide per se is not warranted  after closer inspection.  This holds especially  for the very short
term  in a climate of continuing  ethnic hatred  and even  violence.  However,  this may change
over time.  There  are  actually  signs that in the longer term,  community-driven  development
tools  such  as  social  investment  funds  can  indeed  help  to  bridge  inter-ethnic  gaps  and
contribute to a successful  peace process.  For instance,  nine years after a ceasefire and with a
peace  deal  still  absent,  the Georgian  Social  Investment  Fund  (GSIF) has  recently  begun to
operate  in  South  Ossetia  (see  box  3).  Once  open  ethnic  tensions  start  to  recede  and
interethnic  communication  becomes  possible,  a  social  fund  can  be  a  tool  for  conflict
transformation  in  a  "multi-track  diplomacy"  framework.29 By  allowing  nongovernmental
agents  to  deal with  apolitical,  economic,  and  infrastructure  reconstruction  matters,  a social
fund enables two former warring factions to make first contacts and build bridges.
Policy  Options
The formal safety net and labor markets:  The  constraints  induced  by the  ethnic  nature  of
conflict  make  many  first-best  social  protection  solutions  unworkable,  and  second-best
29  The  notion  of "multi-track  diplomacy"  is  built  upon  the  realization  that  different  actors  and  actions  are
needed at different times during a peace process.  In this framework, track  I represents diplomatic  actions on the
governmental  level,  while  track  2  or  informal  diplomacy  includes  professional,  nongovernmental  conflict
resolution  and interaction  in business, culture,  and  economic  matters  between  nongovernmental  agents (World
Bank 1  999a).  A social fund would fit into track 2.
23solutions  are  the  only  ones  that  are  available.  They  have  to  take  account  of  both  the
requirement to reach ethnic minorities and countering the absence of cross-subsidies  or both.
*  Caution in pushing for interethnic redistribution: Intense  pushing  for  increased
interethnic redistribution  and the merging of pension  and social assistance schemes
can be counterproductive.  From a political economy point of view,  it may be better
to wait for real political will to emerge over time--otherwise there may be a threat to
the peace process.  In the  meantime, ensuring greater harmonization  of the different
systems to facilitate  a  possible later merger may be a better strategy.  In particular,
mechanisms  for exchanging  information  between different funds need to be set up
to  ensure  entitlement  security  of pensioners  who  move  residence  and  to  avoid
pensioners registering for more than one pension.
Box 3: The Georgian Social Investment Fund in Breakaway South Ossetia
In operation  since  1996,  the  Georgian  Social  Investment  Fund  (GSIF)  supports  the  rehabilitation  of social
infrastructure  in  Georgia.  It  covers  the repair  of school  buildings,  water  supply  systems,  irrigation  systems,
hospitals,  as well  as roads. Its approach builds on the active participation  of the local population  in the selection
of projects  through  open  community  meetings  as  well  as  the  rehabilitation,  maintenance,  and  operation  of
facilities  by the  local communities.  Every  project is cofinanced  by the  GSIF  and the  local communities,  who
can provide input either in from of cash, materials,  or labor.
So far the GSIF has  been in operation throughout the territory  held by the Georgian government  and has,
dependent on  the relative social needs,  financed projects in every district. However,  ethnic conflict has kept the
GSIF out of the breakaway  territories of South Ossetia  and Abkhazia.  However, recently  South Ossetia opened
up when both the authorities  in  Tskhinvali,  South Ossetia and the Georgian government  gave the GSIF  the go-
ahead to start operations there.
GSIF  officials  organized  a  seminar  to  introduce  their  work  in Tskhinvali  last  year  and  held  open-
community  meetings in 30 villages.  Subsequently  15  Ossetian and  14 Georgian  villages  in the region  sent in
proposals  for rehabilitation  projects  in their communities,  and,  at the  time of writing,  the  appraisal process  is
ongoing.  The GSIF  has  drafted  special  rules  for  project  implementation.  The  invitation  for tenders  is to  be
published  in both  Georgian  and  South  Ossetian  newspapers.  While bidding  is open  to  contractors  both  from
South Ossetia and Georgia proper, only those with a Georgian license are admitted.  The payment is in cash--in
Georgian  lari and not in the Russian  rubles that circulate  in South Ossetia.  The  acceptance  of these rules by all
parties involved as well as the reports from  GSIF staff on constructive relations  with local  communities  and the
South  Ossetian  authorities  mark a  further step  in the  process  of normalization  of relations  between  the  two
former warring  sides.
*  Introducing  new labor code and labor legislation: As part of a general  overhaul  of
the  pre-war  socialist  social  welfare  system,  a  new  labor  code  should  include
provisions  outlawing  ethnic  discrimination  in  the  labor  market.  However,  a
necessary precondition  for implementing  the code is the existence of a functioning
court  system.30 New  labor  legislation  should  moreover  be  structured  such  as  to
spurs employment generation.
*  Pensions  for returnees: Allow relocating  pensioners  access  to  the  pension  system
operated  by  their  ethnic  group  if  the  pension  system  merger  is  politically
30 While this may be doubtful in a post-ethnic-conflict  country developing  a reliable and fair legal  system whose
development  should  be  high  on  the  political  reform  agenda.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Ombudsman
in Bosnia and Herzegovina  is an example of where antidiscrimination  cases sometimes  generate  enough  public
attention and are resolved in a positive manner.
24unacceptable.  This will promote  return.  It will also, however,  rely on an integrated
mechanism  of transferring  finances  between  different  parts of the  country,  which
may take time to establish.
*  Flat  pensions or not: Very limited administrative capacities and  funds compounded
by potential  problems  in  accessing  individual  work  records  across  (former)  front
lines may leave policymakers  with few other options but to introduce  flat pensions
independent  of work history  and  contribution  record.  Other  transition  economies
that  have  chosen  flat  pensions  initially  used  social  assistance  to  address  old  age
poverty.  However,  as  long  as  countrywide  social  assistance  remains  difficult  to
implement for ethnic tension reasons, it may be worth thinking about how pensions
could  be  used  for  redistribution  purposes  (if there  remains  one  single  pension
system  reaching  across  ethnic  lines).  That  would  imply  differentiating  pension
levels not according to individual contributions but according to need.
*  A  reliable statistical data collection system  that is  "owned"  by  all sides of the
conflict:  Reliable  social  indicators  and  poverty  data  are  a  precondition  for
discussing  possible  equalization  in  tax  policy  or  targeting  mechanisms.
Redistribution  can  only  be  based  on  transparency  of poverty  and  vulnerability
analysis  and  on  pure  economic  arguments.  For  example,  in  countries  where
interethnic  redistribution  was  nontransparent  and  based  mainly  on  political
considerations  and  therefore  perceived  by  many  as  unfair,  any  attempt  at  re-
establishing  a  system  based  on  interethnic  solidarity  has  to  be  apolitical  and
transparent (the former Yugoslav republics are a case in point).
Socialfunds are a useful tool in post-conflict social protection--depending  on their design:
*  Addressing ethnic tension constraints in social  fund design: Donor  influence  and
monitoring can try to ensure that social funds are designed  such that they do in fact
target the most vulnerable  independent of their ethnic background.  Social  fund staff
and  project  implementing  committees  comprised  of representatives  of various
ethnic  groups  can  exemplify  the  need  for  new  partnerships  and  be  a  first  step
toward bridging the interethnic  gap. It also ensures that all sides are heard and that
funds are allocated in a fair manner to all ethnic groups.
*  Geographical  targeting can  ensure  that  a certain  amount  of funds  go to those  areas
where  many  ethnic  minority  communities  reside  and  allows  for  a  transparent
distribution  across  those  subdivisions  that  are  loath  to  share  formal  social  welfare
institutions.  As  the  experience  of social  funds  elsewhere  shows,  the  use  of poverty
maps  and  targets  for a  progressive  allocation  of resources  across  subdivisions  can
address  diverging  poverty trends  (World  Bank forthcoming).  However,  regardless  of
the  design  of a social  fund,  interethnic  tensions will probably  always  instigate  one-
sided allocation decisions as well as accusations of neglect on based on ethnic grounds.
Informal coping mechanisms:  With  the  formal  social  safety  net  running  into ethnic-
tension-driven  difficulties,  the poor will  continue  to rely on some  of those  informal coping
mechanisms that were available  during the war.  Those coping  mechanisms typically  include
(i)  reliance on small-scale  agricultural  production,  (ii)  merging households,  (iii) nonpayment
of public service bills, (iv) remittances  from abroad,  (v) sale of personal belongings,  and (vi)
unregistered  and informal work.
25*  Hands off:  At the very  least, public intervention  should not be in the way of those
coping mechanisms that are legal.  For example,  remittances  from abroad should be
allowed  to  flow  freely  and  should  not  be  taxed  away.  Likewise,  as  mentioned
before,  at  least  initially  the  informal  sector  (and  especially  that  of a  small-scale
nature  such as  petty trading)  should  not  be  reigned  in, but  allowed  to  grow  and
become formal over time (as long it is not criminal).
*  Building on  informal coping mechanisms: Poverty  alleviation  strategies  should
build  on  existing  informal  coping  mechanisms  where  possible.  For  example,
fostering the productivity of small-scale  agriculture  through training and the supply
of equipment  could  be  one  such  option.  Improving  displaced  persons'  temporary
access  to  high-quality  land  can  help  them  become  more  reliant.  Incidentally  this
may  also  counter  urbanization  by providing  demobilized  soldiers  and  displaced
people with a source of income in rural  areas.
V.  Social  Protection in Post-War Bosnia and Herzegovina  and Georgia
Bosnia and Herzegovina  and  Georgia represent two  different cases of a post-ethnic-conflict
environment.  Bosnia and Herzegovina faces the task of implementing a peace agreement and
stitching  the  country  together  again  in  the  face  of  continuing  ethnic  enmity  which
complicates the reform of the welfare state. With the conflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia
effectively  "frozen" and without a solution for them in sight, Georgia is trying to deal with a
massive  displacement  problem and overall  dire  social conditions  due to  effective  economic
stagnation.
Bosnia and  Herzegovina
Bosnia and Herzegovina  emerged from the  1992-1995 war with its economy quite literally in
ruins.  Output  had  collapsed  massively  and  economic  activity  was  at  a  near  standstill,
infrastructure  had been destroyed,  and a significant part of the population was displaced.  The
resulting deep social  crisis, manifested in about 80 percent of the population being dependent
on emergency  food aid for survival  by the end of the war (World  Bank  1996),  called for the
reform  and introduction  of a range of social  protection measures.  Social  protection  reform
had and has to take  place in a climate of continuing ethnic tensions in both entities, the FBH
and the RS, although less so in the RS because of its higher ethnic homogeneity.
Post-war  emergency  recovery  and reconstruction:  In the  immediate  aftermath  of the
war  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  and  in particular  the IDP  community  in both  entities,  relied
much  on  abundantly  available  international  humanitarian  aid to  deal  with its  social  crisis.
First and foremost,  this included the massive food aid program by the WFP and the UNHCR
as well as  a multitude  of NGOs  that  had  fed the  country during  the war.  The  World Bank
included an Emergency  Social Fund into its Emergency Recovery Project to provide minimal
levels of cash assistance for the poorest households  in  1996 and introduced projects aimed at
helping  former  combatants  reintegrate  into  civilian  life.  Public  works  and  employment
programs as well as multisectoral projects with an emphasis on quick employment generation
and institution building were aimed at easing the unemployment crisis.
Since  the end of the war in  1995,  Bosnia and Herzegovina  has witnessed  an economic
boom,  with the  economy  growing at  an average  of 40 percent  annually between  1995  and
261999  (see  table  4)  and  inflation  remaining  in  the  single-digit  range.  Much  of this  growth
came  on  the  back of massive  donor funding  for reconstruction  activities.  However,  donor
funding,  which  has  been receding  over  time, does  not seem to have put the  economy  on a
sustainable  growth  path  and  has  not  resulted  in  sustained  job  creation.  Unemployment
remains  high  with  estimates  of around  36  percent  (lUNDP  1999).  More  long-term  labor
market recovery  has had to rely on structural  reforms and on ensuring  the right incentive  for
job creation.
Table 4. Bosnia and Herzegovinal:  Annual GDP Growth in Percent
1996  1997  1998  1999  2000
86.9  36.7  14.9  12.81  9.6
Source: World Bank data.
Long-term  post-conflict  reconstruction:  The  generous  social  safety  net  Bosnia  and
Herzegovina  inherited  from Yugoslav times required as much  far-reaching  reformn  after the
war as  it had before,  in order to make  it supportive  and consistent with the  overall effort to
put  the  country  onto  a  sustained  growth  path.  Social  protection  reform  formns  part  of an
ambitious structural  reform  program the country embarked  upon in  1998 aimed at creating a
unified  economic  space.  Improving  the  environment  for job  creation  through  ridding  the
labor market from stifling regulations and taxes  surviving from Yugoslav times  and fighting
labor market discrimination  along ethnic  lines through implementing  new and more rigorous
provisions  is  at  the  core  of  more  long-term  social  protection  reform.31 Furthermore,
continuing  labor redeployment  from the military to the civilian sector  is being  supported by
the provision of counseling and training programs for former combatants.32
Social assistance reform  aims, first of all, at raising the resources  to operate a system as
well as at focusing cash benefits on the most vulnerable  and making the system sustainable.
However,  encouraging  the  retargeting  of resources  away  from  those  groups  with  special
political  protection  such  as veterans  (who  receive  a disproportionate  share  of public social
welfare  in both  entities)  is proving  tricky.  Part  of the  agenda  is also  the consolidation  of
funding for the Centers  for Social Works, which are spread all over the country and are well-
placed to deliver social services locally.
Pension  reform has proved  particularly  tricky.  Bosnia and Herzegovina  emerged  from
the war with three separate  pension  systems in place  (for  more on this  see box 2). As with
social  assistance,  reforms  aim at readjusting  entitlements  to available  resources to make the
systems  sustainable.  They  furthermore  push  for  a  greater  coordination  among  the  three
systems  and  even  integration  of the  two  funds  in  the  federation.  In  general,  institutional
reform  aimed  at  improving  tax  collection  and  budget  management  are  at  the  core  of
successful  social protection reform.
31 Discrimination  in the  labor market included,  among other things,  widespread  firing  of ethnic groups  during
and immediately  after the war as well  as predominant  recruitment  of members of the majority ethnic group;  for
details see OSCE (1999).
32 Bosnia and Herzegovina Pilot Emergency  Labor Redeployment  Project
27Difficult political economy  environment:  However,  much  of  this  agenda  remains
unimplemented.  The  structural  reform  drive  is  held back  by continuing  interethnic  enmity
and  opposition to  social  safety nets built on  interethnic  redistribution,  by vested  interests in
favor of the status quo as well as by the misplaced perception that Bosnia and Herzegovina
could continue to rely on outside financial  support. As long as the country remains governed
by  those  nationalist  forces  that  have  plunged  the  country  into  war  and  have  grown
comfortable  controlling  their  stretches  of territory,  there  is  little  readiness  to  create  or
strengthen joint institutions even within the federation.  Moreover,  the nationalist parties have
no interest in deregulating the economy and in transparent privatization,  because many public
enterprises  serve  them  well  as cash  cows.  Social  welfare  provision  in  the federation  has
partly been decentralized to the lowest layer of government where the ethnic homogeneity  is
highest and the need to share funds with the former enemy lowest. Nationalist politicians  and
managers  remain  loath  to  allow  back  former  citizens  and  employees  of different  ethnic
group. Hundreds of thousands  remain displaced  in both entities, and return has rarely moved
beyond the symbolic.  Only the loss of power of those parties resisting the implementation  of
the peace accords seems to offer the chance to break this deadlock.
Community development: While the immediate and politically highly charged aftermath
of the war may not have provided  the right environment for community-driven development
projects  such  as social funds, political  stabilization and  beginning  interethnic  reconciliation
open  up  possibilities  for this  kind  of policies.  Indeed  on  the  back of a certain  degree  of
interethnic  tolerance,  a community  development  project  like  the  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina
Community Development  Project recently  initiated  in Bosnia and Herzegovina  becomes  an
important tool in bridging the ethnic  divide and developing  social trust. Its objectives are to
improve  basic  communal  services  for  low  income  and  poor  communities  in  underserved
municipalities  as  well  as  governance  and  local  government  capacity  to  deliver  services.
Mobilizing  local  communities  to pressure  local  government  to be  more  accountable  can be
seen as  a timely and important means of fostering pro-peace  constituencies  at the grassroots
level to help break up the resistance to the implementation of the peace accords.
The example of Bosnia and Herzegovina  vividly shows how difficult and long-term a task
post-war political  stabilization can be.  It highlights how formal social safety net reform can be
constrained  by  ethnic  enmity  and  how  dependent  it  is  on  a  conducive  political  economy
environment.  Moreover,  as  long  as  the  country  remains  a  difficult  and  politically  unstable
business  environment  with  cumbersome  and  complex  registration  procedures,  stifling  taxes,
regular  and  nontransparent  inspections,  and  an  inefficient judicial  system  potential  foreign
investors stay away--with negative consequences  for a recovery in the labor market.
Georgia
Georgia's history since  1989 has been  dominated  by civil war,  economic turmoil,  a chronic
lack  of political  stability,  and  a  persistent  social  crisis.  Most  importantly,  secessionist
movements  following  the  disintegration  of the  Soviet  Union  and  Georgian  independence
instigated the eruption of violent ethnic conflict in Abkhazia and South Ossetia that led to the
displacement  of more than  300,000  people--a  problem the country  is continuing  to  struggle
with  today.  Both  wars  have  not  been  brought  to  a  conclusion  yet  and  peace  agreements
remain  elusive.  However,  while  the  situation  in  Abkhazia  remains  very  volatile  and
skirmishes  along  the  frontline  are  a  regular  phenomenon,  the  conflict  in  South  Ossetia  is
slowly being overcome and confidence is rising.
28The fall of communist  central planning  and the  resulting crises have  led to  a massive
output  collapse  (see  tables  1 and 5).  However,  the  country  has not  seen  a post-war  boom
similar to the one  in Bosnia  and Herzegovina.  Georgia's  growth performance  has worsened
after a brief period of high growth in 1996 and  1997 and stood at a mere  1.9 percent in 2000.
In  comparison  with  Bosnia  and  Herzegovirna,  Georgia  has  not  received  nearly  as  much
outside donor support and is struggling with making up for the gaps of receding humanitarian
aid  supplies.  At the  same time,  the  Georgian  government  has been  in an acute  fiscal  crisis
ever  since  independence  and  chronically  cannot  afford  to  meet  all  of its  obligations.  The
economic crisis of the early  1990s with hyperinflation and a fiscal collapse largely eroded the
social  protection  system.  From  1995 onward,  as the budgetary  situation  improved  slightly,
the  Georgian  government  began  to  increase  cash  benefits  and  to  improve  targeting  (for
instance by raising the  retirement  age  by  five  years to relieve  the pension  fund).  However,
with tax  collection  continuing  to be  low and  corruption  being  rampant,  cash social  benefit
levels remain low.
Table 5. Georgia: Annual GDP Growth in Percent
1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000
-12.4  -20.6  -44.8  -25.4  -11.4  2.4  10.5  10.7  2.9  2.9  1.9
Source: Aslund (2001); World Bank data.
Importance of the  informal safety  net:  Today,  large  parts  of the  population  remain
impoverished.  The  number  of households  in  Georgia  that  fall  below  the  poverty  line  lies
between around  40 and  11  percent depending  on which poverty line is chosen (World  Bank
1999b).  Urban  poverty  is  more  widespread,  deeper,  and  more  severe  than  rural  poverty,
although there are wide regional differences.  In rural areas, the agricultural sector has turned
out  to  be  a  crucial  safety  net  in  the  years  of  crisis  and  has  absorbed  surplus  labor.
Furthermore,  informal  coping  mechanisms  such  as  migration,  petty  trade,  subsistence
gardening,  merging  households,  as well  as  family  connections  to  find  employment  have
taken over a big role in helping households making ends meet.
The  formal  safety  net focuses  on  displacement:  The  very  rudimentary  current
government  social  safety net policies include pensions, a family poverty  benefit for the very
vulnerable,33 special  pensions  for  war  veterans  and  law  enforcement  officers  and  an
allowance  for IDPs. By Georgian standards, the IDP allowance is generous, because although
it only  covers  about  5 percent  of the  population,  it represents  more  than  20 percent  of all
social  welfare  expenditures.  However,  IDPs  are  significantly  disadvantaged  in  finding
employment  and  suffer  from lower  household income  than the rest of the population  even
when  including  the  IDP  allowance  (not  least  since  the  allowance  is  paid  out  very
infrequently) (IFRC 2000).
Politically delicate displacement problem: Dealing  with  the  displacement  problem
becomes  ever  more  politically  delicate  for  the  government.  Strongly  upholding  the  IDPs'
right to return to the contested territory of Abkhazia, the Georgian government does not want
3  Single pensioners,  children without both parents,  and households where  all members are disabled.
29to  send out the wrong signal  in fostering  the integration  of those IDPs in their current  host
communities--even  if it is  only for  the  time  being.  The  existence  of nearly  300,000  IDPs
from Abkhazia in Georgia proper provides the government with an important bargaining chip
and helps it to secure intemational backing for a resolution of the conflict on its terms. It has,
therefore, until now been content to allocate the allowance  to the IDPs and continue to house
about  half  of them  in  public  collective  centers.  However,  this  policy  of preserving  an
emergency-type  situation  has  been  ongoing  for  nine  years  and  is  proving  increasingly
inadequate.  At the same time, the strong emphasis  of the  social  safety net on the displaced
means that very  few resources  remain  for supporting the other vulnerable  groups in society,
which may result in enmities between those groups and the IDPs. Given this, the UNDP  and
the  World  Bank  have  encouraged  the Georgian  govemment  to shift its approach  to dealing
with the IDP problem  more toward improving the IDPs'  self-reliance and their chances in the
labor market, while underlining the IDPs'  right to return when conditions allow.
One  important  part  of the  Georgian  social  protection  system  is  the  GSIF,  which  has
been  in operation  since  1996.  Its main  objectives  are to  support the rehabilitation  of social
infrastructure  throughout  the  country,  to  foster  decentralization  by  inviting  the  active
participation  of the local population in the selection  and implementation of the project and to
support  the  development  of  small  businesses  and  foster  employment  creation.  Projects
include  the  repair  and reconstruction  of roads,  schools, hospitals,  and water  and electricity
supplies.  Although  its  operations  were  initially  confined  to  the  territory  controlled  by  the
Georgian  government,  the  GSIF has  recently  initiated  projects  in breakaway  South Ossetia
and is becoming a tool to overcome  the ethnic conflict there (see box 3).
Employment is the key to poverty alleviation in Georgia and strong economic  growth is a
precondition  for job  creation  (World  Bank  1999b).  Georgia  will  stand  the  best  chance  of
recovery  if it provides  the  right  conditions  and  incentives  for  investment.  However,  this  is
closely interlinked  with  a solution to the two  conflicts,  in particular  that in Abkhazia,  and  a
successful  attempt at making  Georgia a more stable and predictable  place.  Protecting the rule
of law, fighting corruption, making government  more transparent,  and ensuring the security of
all citizens everywhere is thus to be seen  as part of a consequent attempt at poverty alleviation.
VI. Conclusion
Ethnic  conflict  adds  to the  considerable  challenges  and  constraints  transition  countries  are
facing  when they reform  social safety nets during the post-communist  transition.  While war
makes  people  poorer  and  more  vulnerable,  the  state  is even  less  able  to  fulfill  its  role  in
poverty alleviation.  Furthermore,  interethnic tensions in a post-conflict situation  leave many
traditional  formal social safety net instruments  unworkable.
Those  constraints  notwithstanding,  there  is  an  open  window  of  opportunity  for
wholesale change of the social protection framework because of the complete  breakdown and
the delayed recovery.  Namely, politicians face the choice of either re-establishing the pre-war
socialist policies, which,  on the face  of it, are hardly affordable,  or pushing  ahead with bold
reforms aiming at promoting employment and an efficient social safety net.
Labor markets:  Generally  a  social  protection  strategy  has  to  rely  on  improving  the
individual's  self-reliance  through  enhancing  his  or  her  opportunities  in  the  labor market.
Unemployment  is one  of the main  social dislocation  and both  due to war and the transition.
30However,  employment  is the  key poverty  alleviation  mechanism  where the  welfare  state  is
slender  or nonexistent,  not  least  for vulnerable  groups  such  as  IDPs  and  war  veterans.  In
Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  in the  immediate  aftermath  of war,  public  works  programs  have
proved a useful tool both to provide employment and a first source of income for people and
to  repair  and  reconstruct  public  infrastructure.34 However,  employment  in  public  works
programs  is short term and not sustainable.  It can, therefore,  only serve as an impetus in the
restart of economic  activity, while long-term job creation is better served through improving
the  flexibility  of the  labor  market,  supporting  private  sector-led  growth,  and  investing  in
employment and training programs that support long-term employment.
Social Assistance and Pensions are  potentially  constrained  by political  opposition  to
interethnic  redistribution  and cross-subsidies.  Decentralization  of social safety nets to small
and ethnically homogeneous  subdivisions within one jurisdiction will lead to fragmented  risk
pools  and  persistent  inequality  between  regions.  Where  interethnic  redistribution  is
politically  unwanted, separate social assistance and pension systems should be harmonized to
facilitate later closer cooperation or merger. If and when ethnic tensions recede sufficiently to
allow  increasing  redistribution  across ethnic  lines and a  proper  attempt  at social  safety  net
reform can be made,  formal social assistance  and pension  systems should be simple and easy
to  administer  and transparent  and  limited  to meet  the  needs of the  very  vulnerable.  In the
meantime,  social  protection  should  follow  a  do-no-harm  approach  to  those  coping
mechanisms  surviving from the war.
Socialfunds have the advantageous  feature that they are very adaptable to different and
extreme situations and can be used as an emergency as well as a long-term  development tool.
Their  potential  to  help  building  social  capital  does  not  mean,  however,  that  they  are  a
panacea  to build bridges across the  ethnic  divide. As all other social  safety net instruments,
they need a minimum of interethnic  tolerance to work and be anchored in a somewhat  stable
peace process.
Social  services face high  demand from special  vulnerable  groups such as children; very
young former soldiers;  or women who are victims of rape,  domestic  violence,  or trafficking
and need to be equipped to deal with them in a consistent way across the country.
Timing: The  post-war  situation  can  be  distinguished  into  two  separate  periods:  the
initial  emergency and  stabilization  period and  the more long-term  reconstruction  period.  As
has  become  apparent in this paper,  each  period  requires  a different  set of social protection
policies and priorities.  The  initial  post-war  period is dominated  by attempts to stabilize the
situation  and lay the  ground  for  economic  recovery.  Soldiers  need  to be  demobilized  and
reintegrated,  displaced  people  need  to  be  helped  to  return,  and  infrastructure  needs  to  be
repaired.  Social  protection  policies  form  part  of  emergency  measures  to  deal  with  the
immediate  social  dislocations;  public  works  programs  absorb  people from the vast pool of
the  unemployed  or the  army  and  initiate  reconstruction,  and  emergency  social  assistance
funds step in where the first gaps in humanitarian aid coverage  emerge. However,  most of the
social welfare provision in this period is still covered by humanitarian aid.
A  more  long-term  reconstruction  period  requires,  the  political  situation  and  stability
permitting,  more  long-term  and  structural  reform  measures.  Apart  from engaging  in  large-
34 Bosnia and Herzegovina Emergency Public Works and Employment Project.
31scale reconstruction of infrastructure  and  buildings,  reformers  may want to lay  foundations
for  new  sustainable  social  safety  nets  and  build  flexible  labor  markets  and  reliable
institutions.  However, these reforms are dependent on the nature of the political process in a
post-ethnic-conflict  society,  which tends to be subject to constant disruptions.  This is why in
some  post-conflict  countries  in  the  region  we  see  long  delays  in  tackling  the  structural
problems of building a new and sustainable social welfare system.
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